Because Constructions in English and Kara Constructions in Japanese: From a Contrastive Construction Grammar Perspective*  
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1. Introduction

Over the last two decades, various approaches have been proposed under the name of construction grammar (e.g. Lakoff (1987), Fillmore et al. (1988), Goldberg (1995), Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996), Hirose (1999), Kay and Fillmore (1999), Croft (2001), and many others). Against this background, while researches of language-specific constructions have been fruitful, little attention has been paid to comparing constructions across languages (cf. Weilbacher and Boas (2006)). In want of contrastive analyses in construction grammar, Östman and Fried (2005:9) point out, “a great amount of detailed and cross-linguistically oriented work needs to be carried out in order to determine what, if any, types of meaning-form patterns may have universal validity.”

In response to the need of cross-linguistic researches in construction grammar, the present article presents a contrastive analysis of constructions of causation and reasoning in English and Japanese. In particular, comparing the constructions of causation and reasoning in these two languages, I argue that similar mechanisms lie in understanding causal relations and reasoning processes in English and Japanese. The argument will eventually show the validity of a construction grammar analysis of the conjunction because (e.g. Hirose (1999), Kanetani (2006)) from a cross-linguistic perspective. Examples of constructions to be discussed are given in (1)-(2):¹

¹ Other conjunctive particles than kara, such as node, may be used to introduce a reason in Japanese, as exemplified in (i):

(i) Atsu node tui mizu o nomisugiru hot because can’t help but water ACC drink too much.

Because it is hot, we can’t help but drink water too much.’

(Kojien⁵)

The difference between kara and node has been a topic of heated debate (e.g. Nagano (1952, 1988), Tio (1988), Takeuchi (1997), among others). Although it would be interesting to examine their behaviors, it seems too complicated to deal with in this article. I leave it for future research, and here, I compare because and kara, assuming that they are comparable elements in English and Japanese (cf. Higashizumi (2006)).

Higashizumi presents a detailed observation of the historical development of because and kara, and argues that because- and kara-clauses have developed in the same way. That is, their syntactic extension is from more to less integrated clause-combining constructions, and semantic/pragmatic extension shows subjectification (cf. Traugott and Dasher (2002)). Roughly speaking, in both languages, the reasoning uses, as in b-sentences, have been developed from the causal uses, as in a-sentences. Although their historical
(1) a. John came back because he loved her.
   b. John loved her, because he came back.  

(Sweetser (1990:77))

(2) a. Taro wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekita.
    Taro TOP Hanako ACC love because came.back
    ‘Taro came back because he loved Hanako.’
   b. Taro wa modottekita kara Hanako o aishiteiru nodaroo.
    Taro TOP came.back because Hanako ACC love I.think
    ‘Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.’

(Higashiizumi (2006:117f.))

Sentences (1a, b) show that the conjunction because introduces either a cause or a premise. Sentence (1a) expresses the causal relation between John’s love of her and his coming back, while sentence (1b) denotes the reasoning process in which the speaker draws the conclusion that John loved her from the premise that John came back. Likewise, sentences (2a, b) show that the Japanese conjunctive particle kara also introduces either a cause or a premise.

The organization of this article is as follows. Section 2 explains some basic concepts of contrastive construction grammars, with reviewing Weilbacher and Boas’ (2006) contrastive construction grammar approach to some constructions in English and German. Sections 3 and 4 investigate syntactic and semantic properties of because constructions in English and kara constructions in Japanese, respectively. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.

2. Contrastive Construction Grammars

Although, as I have mentioned in the previous section, little attention has been paid to contrasting constructions across languages, the importance of such analyses has been emphasized recently (e.g. Weilbacher and Boas (2006)). In order to explain how and in what respects constructions in English and German are similar or different, Weilbacher and Boas compare three constructions in the two languages: Resultative constructions (cf. Boas (2003)), tag question constructions (cf. Kay (2002)), and just because X doesn’t mean Y (JB-X DM-Y) constructions (cf. Hirose (1991, 1999), Bender and Kathol (to appear)). Of these three constructions, I briefly overview Weilbacher and Boas’ observations of the JB-X DM-Y constructions and the resultative constructions in English and their German developments are beyond the scope of this article, Higashiizumi’s comparative historical analysis of because and kara leads us to assume that they are comparable elements in English and Japanese.

The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples are as follows: 1/2/3sg.=first/second/third person singular pronoun, ACC=accusative case marker, COP=copula, GEN=genitive case marker, NOM=nominative case marker, NOMI=nominalizer, Q=question morpheme, and TOP=topic marker.
counterparts.

First, the JB-X DM-Y construction in English, e.g. (3a), and its German counterpart (the NW-X HDN-Y construction), e.g. (3b), are very similar both in their forms and in their meanings. Consider the following examples:

(3)  
a. Just because John is rich doesn’t mean that he’s happy.  
    (Hirose (1991:19) [italics are mine])

b. Nur weil ich aus Deutschland komme heisst das nicht, dass Ich Sauerkraut esse.  
   ‘Just because I come from Germany doesn’t mean that I eat sauerkraut.’  
   (Weilbacher and Boas (2006) [italics are mine])

Weilbacher and Boas observe that these two constructions have very similar syntactic structures. In both constructions, both clauses are headed by the comparable lexical items just because/nur weil and doesn’t mean/heisst das nicht. Not only are their syntactic forms similar but also their semantic properties are identical. Weilbacher and Boas roughly describe the meaning of the JB-X DM-Y construction as “DM-Y cannot automatically be inferred from JB-X,” and argue that its German counterpart exhibits the identical meaning. Thus, in the JB-X DM-Y construction and the NW-X HDN-Y construction, the identical meaning is expressed in very similar ways at the syntactic level. In this sense, these constructions do not need so much language-specific information for a cross-linguistic generalization.

Next, let us consider resultative constructions in English and German. Weilbacher and Boas observe that resultative constructions in the two languages, despite their similar functions, differ with respect to the types of restrictions on verbs and postverbal constituents (cf. Boas (2003)). Consider the following resultative constructions with the verb beat (each of which is called “mini-constructions” in Boas’ (2003) terms):

(4)  
a. They beat the olives out of the tree.

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3 The German example provided by Weilbacher and Boas (2006) has a complex sentence structure. That is, if literally translated, sentence (3b) will be: Just because I’m from Germany, it doesn’t mean I eat sauerkraut. Indeed, they consider the constructions in question as having complex sentence structures. In contrast, Hirose (1999) points out that the German language does have the same structure as English JB-X DM-Y constructions, as in (i), and considers the because-clause or the weil-clause as serving the subject.

(i) Nur weil ich Linguist bin, bedeutet nicht, dass ich viele Spachen spreche only because I linguist am means not that I many languagesspeak  
   ‘Just because I’m a linguist doesn’t mean I speak many languages.’  
   (Hirose (1999:606f.))

Whether or not the because-clauses or the weil-clauses are the subject of the sentence, however, is not a point here. See Matsuyama (2001) and Bender and Kathol (to appear) for detail arguments on this issue.
b. They beat the eggs *creamy*.
c. They *beat* the pebbles to a fine dust.
d. They *beat* some sense *into these people*.
e. The mob beat them *to death*.

(adapted from Boas (2003:353) [italics are mine])

Boas (2003) describes the sense of each mini-construction (4a-e) as follows:

(5)

a. (4a)= “To hit repeatedly in order to knock something off or out.”
b. (4b)= “To bring about fronting by mixing with air by means of repeated strong turning, whirling, or agitating.”
c. (4c)= “To pound into a powder paste, or pulp.”
d. (4d)= “To force or drive home by repeated strong admonition or injunction.”
e. (4e)= “[To b]ring or make by hard or crushing blows.”

(adapted from Boas (2003:353))

What is important here is that in order to represent senses (5a-e), German resultatives, as shown in (6a-e), use such different syntactic patterns from those of their English counterparts:

(6)

a. Sie schlügen die Oliven *vom* Baum.
   ‘(Lit.) They beat the olives of the tree.’
b. Sie schlügen die Eier *schaumig*.
   ‘(Lit.) They beat the eggs *foamily*.’
c. Sie *zermahlt* die Steine zu Staub.
   ‘(Lit.) They ground stones to dust.’
d. Sie überzeugten diese Leute.
   ‘(Lit.) They persuaded the people.’
e. Der Mob schlug sie *tot*.
   ‘(Lit.) The mob beat them dead.’

(adapted from Boas (2003:353) [italics are mine])

The italicized words or phrases in (4) and (6) indicate how different the expressions are that are used to represent the same meaning in English and German. For example, in order to express the meanings listed in (5a-e), English uses the same verb *beat*, while German uses different verbs. That is, although as Weilbacher and Boas argue, English resultatives based on the verb *beat* and their German counterparts use such different expressions that more

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4 Weilbacher and Boas (2006) do not argue that all resultative constructions in English and German entirely have no one-to-one correspondences (cf. Boas (2003)). They observe that resultatives based on the verb *wipe* and their German counterparts, for example, show roughly the same meaning extensions, and thus, need less language-specific information for a cross-linguistic generalization, compared with resultatives based on the verb *beat*.
language-specific information is needed to make a cross-linguistic generalization (cf. fn.4).

From the observations of these constructions, Weilbacher and Boas (2006) argue that it is possible to posit the “contrastive JB-X DM-Y construction” and the “contrastive resultative construction” that are inherited by the grammars of both English and German. The former contrastive construction exhibits similar syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties, and thus few language-specific specifications are necessary for a cross-linguistic generalization. By contrast, the latter requires a lot of language-specific information for a cross-linguistic generalization, because different verbs and postverbal elements (i.e. resultative phrases) are used to represent the same meaning from a language to another. Crucially, Weilbacher and Boas suggest that “in contrastive construction grammar, there is a continuum of restrictions placed on the application of contrastive constructions [italics are mine].” That is, the degree of contrast varies from very similar constructions (e.g. the JB-X DM-Y/NW-X HDN-Y constructions) to very different constructions (e.g. the resultative constructions based on the verb beat). Just because the corresponding constructions in the two languages are different, however, does not mean that they are not comparable. The degree of contrast reflects how much language-specific information is needed for cross-linguistic generalizations. In this regard, we may safely say that the less language-specific information the generalization needs, the more universal the constructions are. Constructions (in construction grammar terms) should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction (cf. Fillmore (1988), Fillmore et al. (1988), Kay and Fillmore (1999), Östman and Fried (2005), among many others). Thus, if comparable constructions in given two languages are very similar, it means that people construe the things in a similar way in the two languages.

3. Because Constructions in English

Now that the basic concepts of contrastive construction grammars are given, let us compare and contrast constructions of causation and reasoning in English and Japanese. First, I observe in this section the English constructions in which the conjunction because is used.

As is well known, the conjunction because introduces either a cause of another situation or the premise from which to draw a conclusion, as exemplified in (7a, b):

\[(7)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{a. John came back because he loved her.} \\
&\text{b. John loved her, because he came back.}
\end{align*}
\]

(= (1a))

(= (1b))

The because-clause in (7a) is the reason for his coming back, while that in (7b) is understood as providing the premise from which the speaker draws the conclusion that he loved her. I have argued in Kanetani (2006) that the conjunction because itself is not polysemous but the conjunction participates in two constructions, which may be called the causal because
construction and the reasoning *because* construction, respectively (cf. Hirose (1999)). That is, sentence (7a) is an instance of the causal *because* construction, and sentence (7b) one of the reasoning *because* construction. In the causal *because* construction, a causal relation between P(proposition)₁ and P₂ is mapped onto the syntactic form [C₂ *because* C₁], where C(lause)₁ and C₂ denote P₁ and P₂, respectively. In the reasoning *because* construction, the reasoning process in which the speaker draws the conclusion (expressed by the main clause) from the premise, i.e. the situation described in the subordinate clause, is mapped onto [C₂, *because* C₁]. Thus, their form-meaning correspondences can be represented as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline
\text{causal because construction} \\
\text{sem: } \text{“P₁ is a cause of P₂”} \\
\text{syn: } C₂ \text{ *because* C₁} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline
\text{reasoning because construction} \\
\text{sem: } \text{“P₁ is a premise from which to conclude that P₂”} \\
\text{syn: } C₂, \text{ *because* C₁} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

What is important is that in causal relations, the cause situation and the result situation need to be understood as a single process, while in reasoning processes, the premise and the conclusion are understood separately (Kanetani (2006)). Crucially, these facts reflect the generalization that constructions should be consistent with what we know about cognition and social interaction (cf. Fillmore et al. (1988), Kay and Fillmore (1999)). For example, when we see a causal relation, the cause and the result are perceived at once. In contrast, in an inferential process, we perceive the two situations or propositions (expressed in the main clause and the *because*-clause) separately, and relate them based on our common knowledge of the world.

In Kanetani (2006), I have argued that various phenomena observed in the literature should be attributed to the properties of the constructions. First, causal *because*-clauses can be inside the scope of matrix question or negation, while reasoning ones cannot (cf. Rutherford (1970), Hirose (1991)). Compare the following sentences:

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{(9) a. Is the ground wet because it has rained?}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{\footnote{The causal *because* construction has been simply called the causal construction in elsewhere (e.g. Kanetani (2006)). In order to avoid confusion with the Japanese counterpart to be dealt with in section 4, I use this term in the present article.}}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{\footnote{The causal *because* construction and the reasoning *because* construction are related via what Goldberg (1995) calls metaphorical extension link. That is, comparing a reasoning process to a causal relation, we may use the conjunction *because* to introduce the premise from which to draw a conclusion (cf. Sweetser (1990), Hirose (1999)). For details, see Kanetani (2006).}}
\end{array}
\]
b. * Has it rained, because the ground is wet?
c. Has it rained, because it has rained.

The arrows indicate intonation patterns. In (9a), the rising intonation is used at the end of the sentence. This suggests that both the main clause and because-clause are within the scope of the matrix question. By uttering this sentence, the speaker does not simply ask whether the ground is wet or not, but asks whether the rain has caused the ground to become wet or not. Thus, sentence (9a) performs one speech act as a whole. In contrast, as exemplified in (9b), interrogative sentences of the reasoning because construction will be unacceptable if they are read in the same intonation pattern as that of sentence (9a). As shown in (9c), the rising intonation is used at the end of the main clause, and the sentence-final because-clause is read with a falling intonation. Note also that a period, rather than a question mark, is used. These facts show that in the reasoning because construction, the because-clause is not within the scope of matrix question. Thus, in causal because constructions, the matrix question can range over the whole sentence, while in reasoning because constructions, only the main clause can be within its scope, as shown in (10a-c):

(10) a. Q [the ground is wet because it has rained]
   b. * Q [it has rained, because the ground is wet]
   c. Q [it has rained] because the ground is wet

From these facts, we may say that the causal because construction describes a causal relation as a single process and the whole process of causal relation can be subject to question. By contrast, the reasoning because construction describes two separate situations, i.e. the speaker’s conclusion and its premise, of which only the former can be subject to question.

Second, speech act constructions that convey statements, e.g. topicalizations, rhetorical questions, etc., cannot appear in causal because-clauses, but they can in reasoning because-clauses (cf. Hooper and Thompson (1973), Lakoff (1987)). Consider the following sentences:

(11) a. * He’s not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking.
   (cf. He’s not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson (1973:494)))
   b. I think we have more or less solved the problem for donkeys here, because those we haven’t got, we know about.  (Guardian [online])

In (11a), the topicalization in the because-clause is not allowed. As the parenthesized original sentence shows, the because-clause is inside the scope of the matrix negation. This means that sentence (11a) is an instance of the causal because construction (cf. Rutherford (1970)). In (11b), topicalization may occur in reasoning because-clauses. That is, speech
act constructions are incompatible with causal *because*-clauses, but they can occur in reasoning *because*-clauses. As the very name suggests, “speech act” constructions perform a speech act on their own. This means that *because*-clauses in which a speech act construction occurs perform speech acts independent of the main clauses (and thus, Lakoff refers to subordinate clauses with speech act constructions in them as “performative subordinate clauses”). Therefore, in the causal *because* construction, the *because*-clause and its main clause perform one speech act as a whole. In the reasoning *because* construction, on the other hand, the *because*-clause and its main clause perform two speech acts independent of each other. Assuming that one information unit corresponds to one speech act (cf. Haliday (1985), McCarthy (1991)), we may say that the causal *because*-clause and its main clause are understood as expressing a combined process, while the premise and the conclusion of a reasoning process are understood separately.

Third, causal *because*-clauses can be nominalized into *because of* NP, while reasoning ones cannot (Rutherford (1970)). Observe the following sentences:

(12) a. He’s not coming to class because of (his) sickness.
   b. * He’s not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970:105))

The nominalization of a *because*-clause is compatible with the causal *because* construction, as in (12a), whereas it is incompatible with the reasoning *because* construction, as in (12b). If *because*-clauses are nominalized, they may no longer perform speech acts on their own. As a result, such nominalized *because*-clauses are regarded as merely a part, or a constituent, of larger speech act. From this, we may safely say that in the causal *because* construction, the *because*-clause and the main clause perform one speech act as a whole, while in the reasoning *because* construction, they perform different speech acts.

Fourth, causal *because*-clauses can be clefted, whereas reasoning ones cannot (Nakau (1994)). Compare the following examples:

(13) a. It’s because he’s sick that he’s not coming to class.
   b. * It’s because his wife told me that he’s not coming to class.
   (Nakau (1994:162))

Clefting a *because*-clause makes it focused; accordingly, the main clause is backgrounded. The acceptability of sentence (13a) shows that the main clause of the causal *because* construction may be backgrounded. This is because, as I have stated above, it is merely a part of larger speech act, or an information unit. The reason why sentence (13b) is not acceptable is that the main clause and the *because*-clause in the reasoning *because* construction need to be focused equally. The main clause expresses the logical conclusion that the speaker draws from the premise given in the *because*-clause. As the nature of the logical conclusion, it is newly introduced in the discourse. The *because*-clause, on the other
hand, introduces the premise from which the speaker has drawn the conclusion. As seen above, this is also asserted as an independent speech act. In other words, neither can be backgrounded. Thus, the contrast in (13a, b) also suggests that the causal because-clause and its main clause compose one information unit as a whole, whereas the reasoning because-clause and its main clause are regarded as units which are asserted independently.

Fifth, what Quirk et al. (1985) call exclusives, e.g. merely, just, simply, and the like, may focalize causal because-clauses, as in (14a), but not reasoning because-clauses, as in (14b) (Kanetani (to appear)):

(14) a. He went to college simply because his parents asked him to. (Schourup and Waida (1988:95))

b. * It has rained, just because the ground is wet. (Kanetani (to appear))

The focalization of the because-clause in (14a) presupposes the existence of the situation described in the reason clause (cf. Horn (1969)) and shows that there are no other reasons than the one expressed. That is, there exists a situation that causes the result and it is the only possible cause for the result. Thus, in a causal relation, one result situation combines with one cause situation, expressing a combined process as a whole. In contrast, from the unacceptability of sentence (14b), we may say that there are many possible reasons to draw a conclusion. As I have mentioned earlier in this section, in a reasoning process, it is the speaker that relates two situations expressed in the main clause and the because-clause. That is, the situations in question do not necessarily have any causal relation in the real world. Thus, even if one says, “it has rained, because the ground is wet,” logically, the cause of the wet ground does not have to be the rain. However, the speaker sees the wet ground, and then concludes that it has rained based on his common knowledge of the world or experience. In other words, it may not have rained, and even if it has, there need not be a necessary causal relation between the rain and the wet ground. Besides, there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has rained, say, to see a rainbow in the sky, to see someone get home wet, to hear the news about the rain, etc. In this way, the two situations expressed in a reasoning process need not have a necessary causal relation, and thus the two situations described in them are understood separately.

What is important is that we understand a causal relation as a single process of cause and result situations, whereas in a reasoning process, the speaker relates two situations perceived separately. It is these different ways of understanding causal relations and reasoning processes that are reflected in different behaviors between causal and reasoning because-clauses. Thus, the construction grammar analysis correctly and comprehensively accounts for a lot of facts pointed out in the literature.
4. **Kara Constructions in Japanese**

In order to account for typological variation in a construction grammar framework, Croft (2001:51) notes that “constructions may be compared across languages according to their function.”\(^7\) The functions of the Japanese constructions to be investigated in this section are, of course, equivalent to those of their English counterparts. The Japanese counterpart of *because* is the conjunctive particle *kara* (cf. fn.1). Like *because*-clauses, *kara*-clauses either express the cause of another situation or provide the premise from which to draw a conclusion. Consider the following examples:

(15) a. Taro wa Hanako o aishiteiru kara modotte kita.
Taro TOP Hanako ACC love because came.back
‘Taro came back because he loved Hanako.’

b. Taro wa modotte kita kara Hanako o aishiteiru nodaroo.
Taro TOP came.back because Hanako ACC love I.think
‘Taro loved Hanako, because he came back.’

The *kara*-clause in (15a) is understood as the cause of Taro’s coming back, and the sentence expresses the causal relation between Taro’s love of Hanako and his coming back. The *kara*-clause in (15b) provides the premise from which the speaker draws the conclusion that Taro loved Hanako.

In the previous section, I have shown the validity of the construction grammar approach to the English conjunction *because*. In this section, I extend the constructional view to the *kara* constructions in Japanese, and compare them with their English counterparts. For the sake of convenience, I refer to sentences like (15a) as the causal *kara* construction, and sentences like (15b) as the reasoning *kara* construction. Their form-meaning correspondences may be formalized as follows:

(16) a. **causal *kara* construction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sem: “<em>P</em>₁ is a cause of <em>P</em>₂”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>syn: <em>C</em>₁ <em>kara</em> <em>C</em>₂</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **reasoning *kara* construction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sem: “<em>P</em>₁ is a premise from which to conclude that <em>P</em>₂”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>syn: <em>C</em>₁ <em>kara</em>, <em>C</em>₂</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the causal *kara* construction, a causal relation between *P*₁ and *P*₂ is mapped onto the

\(^7\) Note, however, that Croft (2001) argues that there are no universal constructions.
syntactic form \([C_1 \text{kara} C_2]\). In the reasoning \textit{kara} construction, the reasoning process in which the speaker draws the conclusion from the premise is mapped onto \([C_1 \text{kara}, C_2]\).

Now that the constructions of causation and reasoning in Japanese are defined, let us observe more closely the causal and reasoning \textit{kara} constructions. Specifically, in order to show that \textit{because}- and \textit{kara}-clauses behave similarly in accordance with what construction they participate in, I first investigate behaviors of \textit{kara}-clauses and then compare them with those of \textit{because}-clauses. First, the causal \textit{kara}-clauses can be within the scope of matrix question, while the reasoning \textit{kara}-clauses cannot. Consider the following dialogue:

(17) A: Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo ni konai no?  
Taro TOP cold ACC got because class to not.comeQ
‘Isn’t Taro coming to class because he got cold?’

B: Uun, Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo ni konai  
No Taro TOP cold ACC got because class to not.come
nodewanaku, infuruenza ni kakatta kara jugyou ni not.but the flu DAT got because class to
konai noda yo.  
not.come COP I.tell.you
‘No, it’s not because Taro got a cold, but because he got a flu that he’s not coming to class.’

Speaker B’s answer negates the causal relation between Taro’s cold and his not coming to class. This suggests that speaker A asks whether the causal relation holds or not, rather than merely whether Taro is not coming to class, as shown in (18):

(18) Q [Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo ni konai]
By contrast, as the unacceptable answer by speaker D in (19) below indicates, this kind of relational negation is an inappropriate answer to a question of the reasoning \textit{kara} construction. Observe the following dialogue:

(19) C: Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o  
Taro TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone ACC
kaketekita kara, jugyo ni konai no (kana)?
called because class to not.come Q (I.wonder)
‘Isn’t Taro coming to class, because he just called from Osaka.’

D: * Uun, Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o  
No Taro TOP a.little.while.ago Osaka from phone ACC
kaketekita kara dewanaku, kare no okasan ga so called because not.but 3sg. GEN mother NOM so
itteita kara jugyo ni konai noda yo.
was.saying because class to not.come it.is I.tell.you
‘(Lit.) It’s not because Taro just called from Osaka but because his mother was saying so that (I conclude that) he’s not coming to class.’

D’: Uun, Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kedo, jugyo ni wa kuru yo.

‘No, Taro’s coming to class, although he just called from Osaka.’

The answer by speaker D’, which only negates the statement that Taro is not coming to class, is appropriate. Thus, speaker C, judging from the fact that Taro has called from Osaka, simply asks whether Taro is not coming to class; he cannot ask whether the reason for asking the question is Taro’s phone-call from Osaka or not, as shown below:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Q [Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara jugyo ni konai]
\item Taro wa sakki Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara, Q [Jugyo ni konai]
\end{enumerate}

The contrast of the scope of question is parallel to the one observed in English: The causal subordinate clauses may be inside the scope of matrix question, while the reasoning ones may not.

Second, topicalization, i.e. a kind of speech act construction of statement, cannot occur in causal *kara*-clauses, whereas it may occur in reasoning *kara*-clauses (cf. Maki et al. (1999), Haegeman (2002)). Consider the following contrast:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Taro no shukudai wa Hanako ga ti yatta kara
\item Kimi no shukudaii wa boku ga ti yatta kara,
\end{enumerate}

‘(Lit.) Taro was scolded by the teacher because Taro’s home work, Hanako did ti.’

‘Let’s hang out together, because your homework, I have done ti for you.’

In Japanese, sentence-initial topics are marked by the particle *wa*, In (21a, b), *Taro no shukudai* ‘Taro’s homework’ and *Kimi no shukudai* ‘your homework’ are topicalized, respectively. Causal *kara*-clause (21a) does not allow the topicalization in it, while reasoning *kara*-clause (21b) does.\(^8\)

\(^8\) One may argue that the *kara*-clause used in (21b) belongs to speech-act conjunction in Sweetser’s
Note in passing that the unacceptability of sentence (21a) does not result from the anomalous OSV word-order, but from the topicalization. To show this, observe the following sentence:

(22) Taro no shukudai o Hanako ga $t_i$ yatta kara
Taro GEN homework, ACC Hanako NOM $t_i$ did because
Taro wa sensei ni okorareta.
Taro TOP teacher by was.scolded.
‘Taro was scolded because Hanako did his homework.’

In (22), the sentence-initial object Taro no shukudai ‘Taro’s homework’ is marked by the accusative case marker $o$, not by the topic marker $wa$, and the sentence is acceptable. That is, the OSV word-order in this kara-clause is the result of scrambling, not topicalization. Saito (1989) claims that scrambling does not change the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, it is not prevented from occurring in causal kara-clauses. By contrast, as shown in (21a, b) above, topicalization is compatible only with reasoning kara-clauses. That is, although Japanese is a relatively free word-order language, topicalization, a kind of speech-act construction, is compatible only with reasoning kara-clauses. This is also parallel to the topicalization in English acceptable in reasoning because-clauses, but not in causal ones.

Third, causal kara-clauses can be nominalized into NP notame, while reasoning kara-clauses cannot.9 Observe the following examples:

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9 Whether notame is the counterpart of because of or not may be an issue that needs to be discussed. Note that kara by itself can follow a noun phrase. Of more note is that when it affixes to a noun phrase, as in (i), it functions as an ablative case marker, and the string “NP kara” does not express causal meaning (cf. Higashizumi (2006:119f.)):

(i) Eki kara uchi made aruite juppun desu
station from my.house on.foot ten.minutes COP
‘It is a ten minutes’ walk from the station to my house.’

(Higashizumi (2006:119))
Thus, “NP kara” cannot be considered to be the counterpart of “because of NP.” Then, we need another lexical item that affixes to a noun phrase and functions as a cause marker; notame can be a possible candidate for such a lexical item.

One may further argue that while because and because of seem morphologically and historically related, notame seems to have no such relations with kara. However, it is possible to consider that because and because of (as well as kara and notame) are totally different lexical items in Present Day English (cf. Matsuyama (2001)), whatever relation they have had before. Thus, despite the unrelated morphological status of kara and notame, I assume that the latter is the Japanese counterpart of because of, based on their semantic and syntactic similarities.
(23) a. Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyo ni konai.
   Taro Top cold Acc got because class to not come
   ‘Taro is not coming to class because he got a cold.’

   b. Taro wa kaze notame jugyo ni konai.
   Taro Top cold because of class to not come
   ‘Taro is not coming to class because of a cold.’

(24) a. Taro wa Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara
   Taro Top Osaka from phone Acc called because
   (Tsukuba deno) jugyo ni konai daro.
   (Tsukuba in) class to not come I guess
   ‘Taro is not coming to class (in Tsukuba), because he just called from Osaka.’

   b. ?? Taro wa Osaka kara no denwa notame, (Tsukuba deno)
   Taro Top Osaka from Gen call because of (Tsukuba in)
   jugyo ni konai daro.
   class to not come I guess
   ‘(Lit.) Taro is not coming to class (in Tsukuba) because of his call from Osaka.’

The causal kara-clause in (23a) can be nominalized into kaze notame ‘because of his cold’ as in (23b), while such nominalization of reasoning kara-clause in (24a) is not acceptable, as shown in (24b). Thus, both in English and in Japanese, causal subordinate clauses may be nominalized, whereas reasoning ones may not.

Fourth, causal kara-clauses can be clefted, as in (25a), while reasoning kara-clauses cannot, as in (25b):

(25) a. Taro ga jugyo ni konai no wa kaze o hiita
Taro NOM class to not come NOMI TOP cold ACC got
kara da.
   because COP
   ‘It’s because Taro got cold that he’s not coming to class.’
   (cf. Taro wa kaze o hiita kara jugyoo ni konai. (= (23a)))

   b. ?? Taro ga jugyo ni konai no wa sakki
Taro NOM class to not come NOMI TOP a little while ago
Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara da.
   Osaka from phone ACC called because COP
   ‘(Lit.) It’s because he just called from Osaka that he’s not coming to class.’
   (cf. Taro wa Osaka kara denwa o kaketekita kara jugyoo nikonai daro.)
Again, this contrast is also parallel to the clefting of causal/reasoning *because*-clauses in English.

Lastly, the adverb *tada* can focalize causal *kara*-clauses, as in (26a), while it cannot focalize reasoning *kara*-clauses, as in (26b):

(26) a. Taro wa tada Hanako o aishiteiru kara modottekitara.
Taro TOP only Hanako ACC love because came.back
‘Taro came back only because he loved Hanako.’

b. * Taro wa tada modottekitakara, Hanako o aishiteiru
Taro TOP only came.back because Hanako ACC love
nodaro.
I.guess
‘(Lit.) Taro loves Hanako, only because he came back.’

Here, I assume that the adverb *tada* is an exclusive in Japanese. *Kenkyusha Shin Waei Chu Jiten* [Kenkyusha’s New College Japanese-English Dictionary (5th edition)] gives the following translations to *tada*:

(27) *tada*: merely, simply, only, solely

Since the English words listed in (27) all belong to exclusives, it may be said that *tada* covers the same range of meaning as English exclusives. Then, the focalizability of causal/reasoning *kara*-clauses shows the same contrast as the focalizability pattern of causal/reasoning *because*-clauses in English.

Thus, the observations in sections 3 and 4 can be summarized as follows:

(28) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>causal <em>because</em>/kara</th>
<th>reasoning <em>because</em>/kara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wide-scope reading of question</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>topicalization</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominalization</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clefting</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focalization</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table (28), we learn that causal *because*- and *kara*-clauses behave just alike, and that reasoning *because*- and *kara*-clauses show similar behaviors. I have argued in section 3 that these behaviors of *because*-clauses are reflections of the following properties of the causal and reasoning *because* constructions: The causal *because*-clause and its main clause form one information unit as a whole, while the reasoning *because*-clause and its main clause are understood as forming separate information units. Then, we may say that the causal and reasoning *kara* constructions also have the same properties as the English counterparts. That is, in both languages, a causal relation is understood as a combined process of the cause
situation and the result situation; reasoning is a process in which the speaker relates two situations perceived separately based on his common knowledge of the world.

5. Conclusion

In the last two sections, I have observed that the functionally equivalent constructions in English and Japanese also show parallel syntactic behaviors of their subordinate clauses with respect to (i) the possibility of the wide-scope reading of question, (ii) the (non)occurrence of topicalization in them, (iii) their nominalizability, (iv) the possibility of their clefting, and (v) their focalizability by exclusives. These behaviors of because-clauses are attributed to the properties of the causal because and reasoning because constructions (Kanetani (2006)). By the same token, such behaviors of kara-clauses may be attributed to the causal kara and reasoning kara constructions.

These similarities lead us to posit the “contrastive causal construction” and the “contrastive reasoning construction” in English and Japanese. These contrastive constructions need very little language-specific information for arriving at cross-linguistic generalizations. That is, in English and Japanese, people construe causal relations and reasoning processes in very similar ways. In a causal relation, the cause and result situations are perceived as a single process, while in a reasoning process, the situations expressed in the main clause and the subordinate clause are perceived separately and the speaker relates them based on his common knowledge of the world. It is these similarities that many parallelisms in English and Japanese result from.

Thus, I have shown in this article that similar cognitive mechanisms are observed cross-linguistically (at least, in English and Japanese) in understanding causal relations and reasoning processes. That is, the construction grammar approach that I have proposed in Kanetani (2006) not only explains a lot of phenomena in English but also provides generalizations across languages in combination with language-specific restrictions, such as different lexical items, different word-orders, etc.

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