Why this *Critique*\(^1\) is titled a critique not of *pure* practical reason but simply\(^2\) of practical reason as such,\(^3\) although its parallelism with the critique of speculative reason\(^4\) seems to require the former—on this the treatise provides sufficient information. This *Critique* is to establish merely\(^5\) *that there is pure practical reason*, and with this aim it critiques\(^6\) reason’s entire practical power.\(^7\) If it succeeds in this [aim], then it does not need to critique (as does happen with speculative reason)\(^8\) the *pure power itself* in order to see

1 [Kritik. Here Kant uses the term to refer to the work rather than, as he does most often, to the activity of critique.]

2 [schlechthin, used informally here; usually Kant employs this term (synonymously with schlechterdings) more formally, to mean ‘absolutely.’]

3 [überhaupt. I render this term—except where doing so would be misleading—by ‘as such’ rather than by ‘generally’ (or ‘in general’) because the latter can too often be misread as an adverb modifying some nearby verb. In the few cases where ‘as such’ is used to translate als solch-, this use is readily identifiable by the expression’s placement or by its being set off by commas.]

4 [I.e., the critique of speculative *pure* reason—the subject of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to Kant’s own definition of the term, ‘speculative’ means the same as ‘theoretical’ (compare the etymology of the two terms) except for being confined to objects beyond any possible experience: see the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 634–35 = B 662–63, and cf. below, Ak. V, 47. However, Kant often uses the term more broadly, as pertaining not only to such objects but also to objects of possible experience.]

5 [soll bloß dartun, which could also mean ‘is merely to establish.’ The rendering adopted here looks ahead to ‘in order to see [i.e., establish]’ in the next sentence.]

6 [I.e., examines the scope and limits of: kritisirt.]

7 [Or ‘practical ability’: praktisches Vermögen. I avoid translating Vermögen as ‘faculty,’ because this term may wrongly suggest—in line with the traditional “faculty psychology”—that a Vermögen is some kind of psychological entity “in” the mind, rather than a mere power or ability.]

8 [Although in the original the parenthesis, as is typical for Kant’s writing, occurs at the end of
whether reason is not *overreaching* itself, by merely claiming such a power. For if as pure reason it is actually⁹ practical, then it proves its reality¹⁰ and that of its concepts through the deed,¹¹ and all subtle reasoning¹² against the possibility of its being practical is futile.

With this pure practical power of reason, transcendental *freedom* is now also established—taken, moreover, in that absolute signification in which speculative reason needed this freedom, when using the concept of causality, in order to rescue itself from the antinomy into which it unavoidably falls when it wants to think the *unconditioned* in the series¹³ of causal linkage.¹⁴ Speculative reason was able to put this concept¹⁵ forth only problematically, as not impossible to think, without securing the concept’s objective reality,¹⁶ but only in order to keep an alleged impossibility of what speculative reason must surely accept¹⁷ at least as thinkable from challenging speculative reason’s essence and from plunging this power into an abyss of skepticism.¹⁸

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Kant’s sentence (just after ‘not overreaching itself’), the present context—including, in particular, the next sentence—clearly suggests that Kant intends it to apply to ‘does not need to critique.’

⁹ *[Wirklich.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wirklich)* Unlike in contemporary German, this term never means ‘real’ in Kant (as he uses this latter term), and translating it so tends to distort what Kant is trying to say, especially in contexts—such as the present one—where reality in Kant’s sense is likewise mentioned.

¹⁰ [I.e., its applicability to things (Latin *res*, from which ‘reality’ is derived).]

¹¹ [Or ‘through action’: *durch die Tat*. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 22, Kant defines ‘deed’ as follows: A *deed* is what we call an action insofar as it falls under [more precisely, ‘is subject to’: *unter . . . steht*] laws of obligation, thus also insofar as the subject is regarded in it in terms of the freedom of his power of choice.’ (Translation mine.)]

¹² *[alles Vernünfteln.]*

¹³ [The term is singular here: *Reihe.*]

¹⁴ [-*verbindung*. Whenever possible (exceptions are noted), I use ‘linkage’ and sometimes ‘link’ (or, where needed, ‘combination’) for *Verbindung*, and ‘connection’ for *Verknüpfung*; similarly for the verbs. This is especially appropriate where the two terms occur in the same context, as, e.g., at Ak. V, 51.]

¹⁵ [The concept of *transcendental freedom* taken in the absolute signification.]

¹⁶ [I.e., without securing (rendering secure) the reality that the concept does indeed have. More literally, Kant says ‘without securing [*sichern*] for the concept its objective reality.’]

¹⁷ [gelten lassen.]

Now the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodeictic law of practical reason, forms the *keystone* of the whole edifice of a system of pure reason, even of speculative reason.\(^{19}\) All other concepts (those of God and immortality) that, as mere ideas, remain unsupported in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and acquire, with it and through it, stability and objective reality.\(^{20}\) I.e., their *possibility*\(^{21}\) is *proved* by freedom's being actual,\(^{22}\) for this idea reveals itself through the moral law.

But freedom, among all the ideas of speculative reason, is also the only one whose possibility we *know*\(^{23}\) a priori—though without having insight into it\(^{24}\)—because it is the condition\(^{25}\) of the moral law, which we do know.\(^{26}\) The ideas of *God* and *immortality*, on the other hand, are not conditions of

\(^{19}\)[See below, Ak. V, 28–57.]

\(^{20}\)[See below, Ak. V, 119–34.]

\(^{21}\)[Their real, not just logical, possibility.]

\(^{22}\)[*wirklich*. Here again, translating this term as ‘real’ distorts what Kant is saying, especially since here too *reality* in Kant’s sense has just been mentioned.]

\(^{23}\)[*wissen*.]

\(^{24}\)[*sie . . . einzusehen*. Insight (*Einsicht*), in Kant, is theoretical (rather than practical) cognition; cf. the etymology of ‘theoretical.’]

\(^{25}\)[Lest anyone surmise that he encounters *inconsistencies* here if I now call freedom the condition of the moral law and afterwards, in the treatise, maintain\(^{a}\) that the moral law is the condition under which we can first of all *become aware*\(^{b}\) of freedom, I wish only to point out\(^{c}\) that whereas freedom is indeed the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi*\(^{d}\) of freedom. For if the moral law were not *previously* thought distinctly in our reason, we would never consider ourselves entitled to *assume* such a thing\(^{e}\) as freedom (even though freedom is not self-contradictory). But if there were no freedom, then the moral law *could not be encountered*\(^{f}\) in us at all.]

\(^{a}\)[*behaupten*.]

\(^{b}\)[Or ‘conscious’: *bewußt*.]

\(^{c}\)[*erinnern*.]

\(^{d}\)[Respectively, ‘reason for the being’ and ‘reason for the cognizing.’]

\(^{e}\)[*so etwas*.]

\(^{f}\)[Literally, ‘would not be [there] to be encountered’: *würde . . . nicht anzutreffen sein*. This second case thus illustrates how freedom is the moral law’s *ratio essendi*, whereas the preceding case illustrated how the moral law (as thought by us) is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom.]

\(^{26}\)[See below, Ak. V, 27–33, 42–50.]
the moral law, but conditions only of the necessary object of a will determined by this law, i.e., conditions of the merely practical use of our reason. Hence concerning those ideas we cannot claim to cognize and have insight into—I wish to say not merely their actuality, but even their possibility. But they are nonetheless conditions for the application of the morally determined will to its object that is given to it a priori (the highest good). Consequently their possibility can and must in this practical reference be assumed even without our theoretically cognizing and having insight into them. For this latter demand [that we assume the possibility of these ideas] it suffices, for a practical aim, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contradiction). Here there is, then, a basis of assent—merely subjective in comparison to speculative reason, yet valid objectively for an equally pure but practical reason—whereby the ideas of God and immortality are provided, by means of the concept of freedom, with objective

27 [des moralischen Gesetzes.]
28 [Viz., the highest good. Cf. just below.]
29 [Rather than theoretical.]
30 [behaupten.]
31 [Kant here means (cf. just below) cognize theoretically: [theoretisch] erkennen; on Kant's view we do have practical cognition of God and (our soul's) immortality—not, however, theoretical cognition and hence insight. It is essential, moreover, that erkennen (similarly for the noun, Erkenntnis) be translated throughout not as 'to know,' but as 'to cognize,' precisely because on Kant's view—as this passage begins to indicate—our practical cognitions (Erkenntnisse) of God and immortality are not instances of knowledge (Wissen) but of rational (moral) faith. See below, Ak. V, 122–48, esp. 132–38 and 144–46, cf. 57. See also the Critique of Pure Reason, B xxi and the famous passage at B xxx, as well as A 633–34 = B 661–62 and A 828–29 = B 856–57; and cf. the Critique of Judgment, Ak. V, 467, 469–70, 472, and 475.]
32 [Reading sind sie Bedingungen for sind die Bedingungen, i.e., 'they are . . . the conditions.' The reading adopted here fits best with what Kant has just said.]
33 [On the highest good, see below, Ak. V, 107–19.]
34 [Beziehung.]
35 [in praktischer Absicht.]
36 [Literally, 'basis of considering-true': Grund des Fürwahrhalteins. With a few exceptions, I translate Grund as 'basis' rather than 'ground.' One advantage of this rendering is that the corresponding 'based on' is rather less awkward than 'grounded in.' But the main advantage is that whereas the 'ground' terminology tends to suggest a logical relation, the 'basis' terminology is much broader—almost always appropriately so. E.g., a Bestimmungsgrund, i.e., a basis determining something, can be all sorts of things.]
reality and with an authority,\textsuperscript{37} indeed a subjective necessity (a need of pure reason), to assume them. This,\textsuperscript{38} however, does not expand reason in its theoretical cognition, but only gives us the possibility\textsuperscript{39} [of God and immortality], which previously was only a problem and here becomes an assertion,\textsuperscript{40} and thus connects\textsuperscript{41} the practical use of reason with the elements of the theoretical use. And this need [of pure reason] is by no means a hypothetical one for a discretionary\textsuperscript{42} aim of speculation, where one must assume something if one wants to ascend to the completion\textsuperscript{43} of reason’s use in speculation; rather, it is a legal need\textsuperscript{44} to assume something without which what one ought to set irremissibly as the aim of one’s doing and refraining\textsuperscript{45} cannot be done.\textsuperscript{46}

It would indeed be more satisfying for our speculative reason to solve those problems\textsuperscript{47} on its own, without this detour, and to preserve them as insight for practical use; but it so happens that our power of speculation is not so well off. Those who boast of such lofty cognitions should not keep them back but should exhibit them publicly to be tested and highly esteemed. They wish\textsuperscript{48} to prove; very well, let them prove, and the critique\textsuperscript{49} will lay all its weaponry at their feet, [acknowledging them] as victors. Quid statis? Nolint. Atqui licet esse beatis.\textsuperscript{50} Since, then, they are in fact not

\textsuperscript{37} [Befugnis.]
\textsuperscript{38} [I.e., the providing of the ideas of God and immortality with objective reality and with an authority and subjective necessity to assume them.]
\textsuperscript{39} [The real, not just logical, possibility.]
\textsuperscript{40} [Assertion.]
\textsuperscript{41} [verknüpfen.]
\textsuperscript{42} [Or ‘optional’: beliebig.]
\textsuperscript{43} [Or ‘perfection’: Vollendung.]
\textsuperscript{44} [I.e., a need arising from the (moral) law: ein gesetzliches. I have deleted the emphasis on ein (‘a’).]
\textsuperscript{45} [seines Tuns und Lassens.]
\textsuperscript{46} [geschehen.]
\textsuperscript{47} [Of God and immortality: Aufgaben.]
\textsuperscript{48} [wollen.]
\textsuperscript{49} [The (activity of) critique in general. Likewise at the beginning of the next paragraph.]
\textsuperscript{50} [The quote is from Horace’s Satires, I, i, 19. A god (who turns out to be Jupiter), having offered to people unhappy with their lives the opportunity to change places with others, yet find-
willing, presumably because they are unable, we must only take up that weaponry again in order to seek the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality—for the possibility of which speculation does not find sufficient warrant—in a moral use of reason, and to base them on this use.

Here the critique’s puzzle as to how one can deny objective reality to the suprasensible use of the categories and yet grant them this reality in regard to the objects of pure practical reason is also for the first time explained. For beforehand, as long as such a practical use is familiar only by name, this must necessarily look inconsistent. But now one becomes aware, by a complete dissection of reason’s practical use, that here the reality at issue does not aim at any determination of the categories and expansion of cognition to the suprasensible, but that what is meant by this reality is only that in this [practical] reference an object belongs to them at all, because they are either contained in the necessary a priori determination of the will or inseparably linked with the object of this determination. Hence that inconsistency vanishes, because a different use is being made of those concepts from the use that speculative reason requires. On the contrary, there now discloses itself a very satisfying confirmation, hardly to be expected before, of the speculative critique’s consistent way of thinking. For while that critique urged us to allow objects of experience taken as such—

51 [nicht wollen.]  
52 [I.e., again, real possibility.]  
53 [See below, Ak. V, 119–21, 134–41.]  
54 [übersinnlich.]  
55 [ihnen. Erdmann instead reads ihm, i.e., ‘it,’ which then refers not to the categories but to their suprasensible use.]  
56 [man . . . kennt. See below, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120.]  
57 [Reading, with Erich Adickes and with Paul Natorp in the Akademie edition, des letzteren for der letzteren, which would refer (implicitly) to practical reason.]  
58 [I.e., the categories.]  
59 [I.e., taken as objects of experience, not as the things that these objects are in themselves. For Kant’s view that the things that appear are things in themselves (although we can have the-
including even our own subject\(^{60}\)—to hold only as \textit{appearances}, but yet to base them on things in themselves, and therefore not to regard everything suprasensible as invention and the concept of the suprasensible as empty of content, \[\text{practical reason now yields confirmation}: \text{practical reason, on its own and without having made an agreement with speculative reason, now provides a suprasensible object of the category of causality, namely \textit{freedom}, with reality (although—since this [freedom] is a practical concept—it also does so only for practical use); thus it confirms by a fact\(^{61}\) what in the speculative critique could only be \textit{thought}.\] With this, at the same time, the strange though indisputable assertion of the speculative critique, that in \textit{inner intuition} even the \textit{thinking subject is merely an appearance to himself},\(^{63}\) now also receives in the critique of practical reason its full confirmation—and is here confirmed so well that one must arrive at it even if the former critique had not proved this proposition at all.\(^{64}\)

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\(^{60}\) I.e., ourselves as subjects.

\(^{61}\) \textit{Faktum}. On the fact of reason, see below, Ak. V, 31 incl. br. n. 75.

\(^{62}\) See below, Ak. V, 27–33, 42–50.


\(^{64}\) The reconciliation\(^{a}\) of causality as freedom with causality as natural mechanism—the first of which is established\(^{b}\) through the moral law,\(^{c}\) the second through the law of nature, and indeed in one and the same subject, the human being—is impossible without presenting\(^{d}\) the human being in reference to the first as a being in itself but in reference to the second as an appearance, the former in \textit{pure} and the latter in \textit{empirical} consciousness. Otherwise the contradiction of reason with itself is unavoidable.

\(^{a}\) [\textit{Vereinigung}.]

\(^{b}\) [\textit{feststehen}.]

\(^{c}\) [\textit{Sittengesetz}.]

\(^{d}\) [\textit{vorstellen}, traditionally translated as ‘to represent’; the noun, \textit{Vorstellung}, is similarly translated here as ‘presentation’ rather than as ‘representation.’ (In contexts where ‘to present’ and ‘presentation’ might sound misleading and the original terms are applied narrowly, I use ‘to conceive’ and ‘conception’ instead.) Presentations, as the term is here used, are such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata; see the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A 320/B 376–77 and A 140/B 179. I have abandoned the traditional rendering of \textit{Vorstellung} (similarly for the verb) because it suggests that Kant’s theory of sensation, perception, cognition, etc., is representational, which it is not. For one thing, \textit{vorstellen}, in the Kantian use of the term that is relevant here, is not—as the ‘representation’ terminology tends to suggest—something that \textit{Vorstellungen} do; it is some-
Through this [explanation] I also understand why the most significant objections against the *Critique of Pure Reason* that I have so far encountered revolve precisely about these two points: viz., *on the one hand,* an objective reality of the categories [as] applied to noumena that is denied in theoretical and asserted in practical cognition; *on the other hand,* the paradoxical demand to make oneself, as subject of freedom, a noumenon, but simultaneously also, with regard to nature, a phenomenon in one’s own empirical consciousness. For, as long as people had not yet framed any determinate concepts of morality and freedom, they could not divine, on the one hand, on what, as noumenon, they were to base the alleged appearance, and, on the other hand, whether indeed framing a concept of this noumenon was still possible at all, if all the concepts of pure understanding in its theoretical use had already been dedicated beforehand exclusively to mere appearances. Only a comprehensive *Critique of Practical Reason* can remove all this misinterpretation and put the consistent way of thinking, which indeed amounts to its greatest merit, in a clear light.65

So much by way of justification as to why the concepts and principles66 of pure speculative reason, which, after all, have already undergone their special critique, are in this work now and then subjected to examination thing that we do. Above all, however, *vorsellen* as so used never means anything like ‘to represent’ in the sense of ‘to stand for.’ Even an empirical intuition, e.g., does not stand for—does not represent—an object of experience (let alone a thing in itself), but rather enters into the experience which that object of experience is. This already serious problem with the ‘representation’ terminology has traditionally been aggravated further by the fact that another Kantian term, *Darstellung* (similarly for the verb), has simultaneously been translated most commonly as ‘presentation’ (less often, but appropriately, as ‘exhibition’), which suggests an incorrect and very misleading relation between *Vorstellung* and *Darstellung.* The traditional rendering of *Vorstellung* as ‘representation’ seems to have been prompted by Kant’s own linking of *Vorstellung* to the Latin *repraesentatio.* However, this Latin term actually means no more than a ‘making present to oneself’—cf. German *Vergegenwärtigung*—and thus, like Kant’s *Vorstellung,* carries no implication whatsoever that perception, cognition, etc., are representational. Latin *praesentatio,* on the other hand, means only a ‘handing over’ (of something); and although Kant could have attached a new meaning to *praesentatio*—as I have done with ‘presentation’—he had no need to, since *repraesentatio,* unlike ‘representation,’ already fit his meaning of *Vorstellung.* The terminological adjustments that I have here described are not new; I already made them in my translations of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* and *Critique of Pure Reason* (both listed in the Selected Bibliography).]

65 [See below, Ak. V, 42–57.]

66 [*Grundsätze.* In this *Critique,* as in the other two, I render both *Grundsatz* and *Prinzip* as ‘principle,’ since Kant does seem to use the two terms interchangeably. Cf. Kant’s *Logic,* Ak. IX, 110, where this interchangeability is made explicit.]
once more. Ordinarily\textsuperscript{67} this is not very fitting for the systematic progression of a science that is to be built (since matters that have been adjudicated must properly only be cited and not be raised again). Yet here it was permitted—indeed, necessary. For reason, with those concepts, is being considered in transition to a use of them that is entirely different from the use that it made of them there. Such a transition, however, makes it necessary to compare the older with the newer use, in order to distinguish carefully the new track from the previous one and to draw attention simultaneously to their coherence.\textsuperscript{68} Hence considerations of this kind, including the consideration that has once more been directed— but in pure reason’s practical use—to the concept of freedom, should not be regarded as interpolations that might serve only to fill gaps in the critical system of speculative reason (for this system is complete in its aim) and to be supplemented,\textsuperscript{69} as tends to come about when a building is rushed, by props and buttresses attached afterwards. They should be regarded, rather, as true members that make discernible the coherence of the system, so that concepts that could there be presented\textsuperscript{70} only problematically are now made accessible to insight\textsuperscript{71} in their real exhibition.\textsuperscript{72} This reminder concerns above all the concept of freedom. One cannot help noting with astonishment that so many people still boast of being capable of ready insight into this concept and of explaining the possibility of freedom.\textsuperscript{73} They boast of these abilities because they consider the concept merely in psychological reference, whereas if they had previously examined it in transcendental reference they would have had to cognize\textsuperscript{74} its \textit{indispensability} as a problematic concept in a complete use of

\textsuperscript{67} [\textit{sonst}.]
\textsuperscript{68} [\textit{Zusammenhang}. Cf. ‘coherence of the system,’ below.]
\textsuperscript{69} [\textit{noch}.]
\textsuperscript{70} [\textit{vorgestellt}.]
\textsuperscript{71} [\textit{jetzt \ldots einsehen zu lassen}.]
\textsuperscript{72} [\textit{Darstellung}.]
\textsuperscript{73} [I follow the \textit{Akademie} edition in reading \textit{derselben}, in accordance with the first edition (of 1788). The second edition (of 1792) has \textit{desselben}, which makes the possibility be that of the concept of freedom. It should be noted that the second edition does not seem to have been edited by Kant himself. See Paul Natorp’s introduction to the \textit{Akademie} edition of the work, Ak. V, 498, and Karl Vorländer’s introduction to the \textit{Philosophische Bibliothek} edition, v. 38, xlv–xlvi.]
\textsuperscript{74} [Or ‘recognize’: \textit{erkennen}.]
speculative reason as well as its utter incomprehensibility;\textsuperscript{75} and if thereafter they had proceeded with it to the practical use, they would have had to arrive on their own at exactly the same determination of it in regard to its principles, which they are ordinarily so reluctant to accept.\textsuperscript{76} The concept of freedom is the stumbling block for all empiricists, but also the key to the most sublime practical principles for critical moralists, who thereby gain the insight that they must necessarily proceed rationally. I therefore beseech the reader not to survey with merely a cursory glance what is said about this concept at the conclusion of the Analytic.\textsuperscript{77}

I must leave it to the experts in this sort of work to judge\textsuperscript{78} whether such a system of pure practical reason as is here being developed from the critique of this power\textsuperscript{79} has made it a matter of much or little trouble not to miss, above all, the right viewpoint from which the whole of this power can be traced out correctly. The system\textsuperscript{80} does presuppose the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals},\textsuperscript{81} but only insofar as that work provides\textsuperscript{82} a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and indicates as well as justifies a determinate formula of duty;\textsuperscript{83} otherwise it subsists on its own.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{[Unbegreiflichkeit.]}\textsuperscript{76} \textit{sich zu . . . verstehen.}\textsuperscript{77} \textit{[See below, Ak. V, 89–106.]}\textsuperscript{78} \textit{[beurteilen. In most Kantian texts and in German generally, this is simply the transitive analogue of urteilen—cf. English ‘bemoan’ and ‘moan.’ By the same token, the corresponding nouns are likewise synonymous, except that Beurteilung means ‘judgment’ only in the sense of (act of) judging whereas Urteil means ‘judgment’ in this sense or in the sense of proposition.]}\textsuperscript{79} \textit{[Of practical reason (as such; cf. the beginning of this Preface): der letzteren.]}\textsuperscript{80} \textit{[The system of the critique, not of the science (cf. below): Es.]}\textsuperscript{81} \textit{[Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten of 1785.]}\textsuperscript{82} \textit{[Literally, ‘makes’: macht.]}\textsuperscript{83} A reviewer\textsuperscript{a} who wanted to say something to censure that work hit the mark better than he himself may have intended when he said that no new principle of morality\textsuperscript{b} has been put forth in it\textsuperscript{c} but only a new formula. But who indeed could\textsuperscript{d} introduce a principle of all morality\textsuperscript{e} and, as it were, first invent morality—just as if before him the world had been in ignorance or in thoroughgoing error concerning what [one’s] duty is?\textsuperscript{f} But whoever knows what a formula means to a mathematician, a formula that determines quite precisely and keeps one from missing what is to be done in order to comply with an assignment,\textsuperscript{g} will not consider a formula that does this with regard to all duty as such to be something insignificant and dispensable.

\textsuperscript{a} [Although there has been some disagreement on this point, it does seem clear that Kant is
That the division of all practical sciences to the point of completeness, such as the critique of speculative reason accomplished, has not been added—for this too a valid basis can be found in the constitution\(^8^4\) of this practical power of reason. For, the particular determination of duties as human duties, which is needed in order to divide them, is possible only if the subject referring to Gottlob August Tittel (1739–1816), ecclesiastical counselor at Karlsruhe, and his Über Herrn Kant's Moralreform—i.e., On Mr. Kant's Moral Reform—(Frankfurt and Leipzig: Gebrüder Pfähler, 1786; reprinted, Brussels: Culture et civilisation, 1969). In that work, Tittel speaks (ibid., 55) of Kant's "alleged new principle of the doctrine of morals" and asks (ibid., 35), "Is the entire Kantian moral reform indeed to limit itself just to a new formula?" See Paul Natorp's comments on the Akademie edition of this Critique, Ak. V, 506–07 (cf. 497), and Karl Vorländer's introduction to the Philosophische Bibliothek edition of the same work, vol. 38, xvi–xvii. Both Natorp and Vorländer (loc. cit.) do also mention another reviewer of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, viz., Johann Friedrich Flatt (1759–1821), a theologian and philosopher at Tübingen who was the regular philosophical reviewer for the Tübingische gelehrte Anzeigen (Vorländer modernizes Tübingische to Tübinger), i.e., Tübingen Scholarly Announcements. The review by Flatt (who was later ennobled to von Flatt) appeared there on February 16, 1786 (item 14, 105–12). However, both Natorp and Vorländer (loc. cit.) expressly link Tittel, not Flatt, to this location in Kant's Preface, presumably because the cited passages from Tittel fit the present context so perfectly. It is true that when Natorp, in his comments on Kant's Metaphysics of Morals of 1797 (Ak. VI, 521, cf. V, 497, 506–07), points out that Kant's reference in that work (at Ak. VI, 207) to "a Tübingen reviewer" is to Flatt, he adds that this "is in all probability the same reviewer whom Kant already had to fend off in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason." But although Kant does in this Preface respond (without giving a name) to some of Flatt's charges (several of which, including that of "inconsistency," can also be found in Tittel's book), this comment by Natorp is entirely consistent with those cited above, since it does not imply that the reviewer alluded to at this location of the Preface is Flatt rather than Tittel.\(^b\)

\(^b\) [Prinzip der Moralität.]

\(^c\) [See the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 403–04.]

\(^d\) [wollte, in one of its less common senses.]

\(^e\) [Grundsatz aller Sittlichkeit.]

\(^f\) [was Pflicht sei, which can refer either to duty per se or to the actions that are one's duty. The reading adopted here fits the continuation of Kant's note. See also Kant's characterization of duty below, Ak. V, 80.]

\(^g\) [Aufgabe.]

\(^8^4\) Beschaftenheit. In my translations of the first and third Critiques I have, wherever possible, translated this term—in the sense in which it occurs here—as 'character' (and beschaffen sein similarly as 'to be of [this or that] character' rather than 'to be constituted [in this or that way]'), in order to keep this term from being linked erroneously with Kant's technical term 'constitutive' as distinguished from 'regulative.' In this Critique, on the other hand, the paramount concern must be to keep the term Beschaffenheit—when used in this sense—from being confused with Charakter ('character') in the sense that is central to morality. However, Beschaffenheit has also another sense—in which things can be said to have eine Beschaffenheit—and when it occurs in that other sense I translate it, as I did in the other two Critiques, as 'characteristic.']
of this determination (the human being) has previously been cognized in
terms of the constitution with which he is actual, although only to the ex-
tent necessary in reference to duty as such. This constitution, however,
does not belong in a critique of practical reason as such; such a critique is to
indicate completely only the principles of this power's possibility, of its
range and bounds, without particular reference to human nature. Here,
therefore, the division belongs to the system of the science, not to the sys-
tem of the critique.

A certain reviewer of that *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*—
truth-loving and acute, therefore always still worthy of respect—raised the
objection that the concept of the good was not there established (as, in his
opinion, would have been necessary) before the moral principle; I have, I
hope, dealt adequately with this objection in the second chapter of the An-
alytic. I have also taken into account—and I shall continue to do so—

85 [nach.]


87 [The human being's actual constitution, i.e., his nature (cf. below), which thus includes the
particular: diese.]

88 [The reviewer was Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730–98). The review, which appeared in
*Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (vol. 66, part II, 447–63), was anonymous. However, Daniel
Jenisch (1762–1804), in a letter to Kant dated May 14, 1787 (Ak. X, 486 [second edition, pub-
lished in 1922, of Kant's *Correspondence*; in the first edition, published in 1900, the page is
463]), says that the reviewer in question "is supposed to be [soll... seyn] Provost Pistorius on
[the Baltic island of] Fehmarn, the translator of [David] Hartley [1705–57]," which identifies
him as the Pistorius named above.]

89 [See below, Ak. V, 57–71.]

90 A further objection could be raised against me, viz., why I also did not explicate beforehand the concept of our *power of desire*, or of the *feeling of pleasure*—although this reproach would be improper, because one should properly be able to presuppose this explication as given in psychology. However, in psychology the definition might indeed be so framed that the feeling of pleasure would (as is actually commonly done) be laid at the basis of the determination of our power of desire; but thus the supreme principle of practical philosophy would necessarily have to turn out to be *empirical*—which surely must first of all be established, and is utterly refuted in this *Critique*. Here, therefore, I want to give the explication as it must be [given] in order to leave this disputed point undecided at the beginning, as is proper.

— Life is a being's power to act according to laws of the power of desire. The *power of desire* is the being's *power to be, through its presentations, [the] cause of the actuality of the objects of these presentations. Pleasure* is the presentation of the agreement of the object or of the action with the subjective conditions of life,
many other objections that have reached me from men who reveal by their will[power] that they have at heart the discovery of truth (for, those who have only their old system before their eyes and for whom it is already settled beforehand what is to be approved or disapproved are not about to demand a discussion that might stand in the way of their private aim).

When one is concerned to determine a particular power of the human soul in terms of its sources, contents, and bounds, then indeed, by the nature of human cognition, one cannot start except from the soul’s parts, their exact and (as far as is possible according to the current situation of what elements of the soul we have already acquired) complete exhibition. But there is also a second attentiveness that is more philosophical and architectonic: viz., to i.e., with the power [consisting] of the causality of a presentation in regard to the actuality of its object (or [in regard to] the determination of the subject’s forces\textsuperscript{b} to action in order to produce the object). I need [say] no more on behalf of a critique of concepts borrowed from psychology; the rest is accomplished by the Critique itself. This explication [of those concepts], one readily becomes aware, leaves undecided the question as to whether pleasure must always be laid at the basis of the power of desire, or whether under certain conditions it only follows upon that power’s determination; for this explication is composed of none but characteristics\textsuperscript{i} of pure understanding, i.e., categories, which contain nothing empirical. Such caution—viz., not to anticipate one’s judgments by a risky definition before the concept has been dissected completely, which often is not achieved until very late—is very commendable in all of philosophy, and yet is often neglected. Indeed, it will be noticed in the entire course of the critique (of theoretical as well as practical reason) that one finds in this course ample\textsuperscript{e} occasion to compensate for many deficiencies in the old dogmatic progression of philosophy, and to correct\textsuperscript{k} mistakes that remain unnoticed until a use of reason is made of concepts\textsuperscript{i} that aims at the whole of reason.\textsuperscript{f}

\textsuperscript{a} [erklären.]
\textsuperscript{b} [Cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 211–14.]
\textsuperscript{c} [Or ‘ability’: Vermögen.]
\textsuperscript{d} [Cf. the Critique of Judgment, Ak. V, 177n, and Kant’s First Introduction to that work, Ak. XX, 230n.]
\textsuperscript{e} [Cf. (and contrast) the Critique of Judgment, Ak. V, 204, 220, 222, and the First Introduction thereto, Ak. XX, 230–31, also 206.]
\textsuperscript{f} [Übereinstimmung.]
\textsuperscript{g} [Handlung.]
\textsuperscript{h} [Or ‘powers’: Kräfte.]
\textsuperscript{i} [MERKMALEN.]
\textsuperscript{j} [MANNIGFALTIG.]
\textsuperscript{k} [Literally, ‘alter’: abändern.]
\textsuperscript{1} [von Begriffen einen Gebrauch der Vernunft macht. Natorp wonders if we should read, instead, von Begriffen der Vernunft einen Gebrauch machen, i.e., ‘a use is made of concepts of reason.’]
grasp correctly the idea of the whole and, on the basis of this idea and in a pure power of reason, to fix one's eyes upon all those parts in their reciprocal reference to one another by means of their derivation from the concept of that whole. This examination and warrant is possible only through the most intimate acquaintance with the system. Those who were irked by the first investigation and hence did not consider acquiring that acquaintance worth the trouble do not reach the second level, viz., that of the overview, which is a synthetic return to what had previously been given analytically; and it is no wonder if they find inconsistencies everywhere even though the gaps that suggest these inconsistencies are to be encountered not in the system itself but merely in their own incoherent progression of thought.

I am not worried at all, in regard to this treatise, about the reproach that I want to introduce a new language,\(^91\) because here the kind of cognition is one that by itself approaches popularity. Even in regard to the first Critique this reproach could not have occurred to anyone who had thought it through rather than merely leafed through it. To contrive new words where the language already has no lack of expressions for given concepts is a childish endeavor to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts then at least by new patches on the old garment. If, therefore, the readers of that work know of more popular expressions that are yet just as adequate to the thought as mine seemed to me, or if perhaps they would venture to establish the nullity of these thoughts themselves and thus simultaneously of any expressions designating them, then by the first they would greatly oblige me, for I want only to be understood, but for the second they would deserve well of philosophy. However, as long as those thoughts continue to stand, I very much doubt that expressions adequate to them and nonetheless more prevalent are likely\(^92\) to be found for them.\(^93\)

\(^91\) [Kant's retort is directed mainly against Gottlob August Tittel (see above, Ak. V, 8 br. n. 83a), who in his book had chastised Kant for his "overly frequent use of abstract terminologies" (op. cit., 4), and for "promulgating long since familiar things as new in an inarticulate language" (ibid., 25).]

\(^92\) [dürften.]

\(^93\) Here I am worried more (than about not being understood) about being now and then misinterpreted with regard to some expressions that I selected with the greatest care in order to keep them from missing the concept[s] to which they point. Thus in the table of categories of practical reason,\(^a\) under the heading of modality, the permitted and not permitted (practically objectively possible and impossible) have almost the same sense in the ordinary use of language\(^b\) as do the immediately following categories duty and contrary to duty. Here, however, the first [pair] is to
In this way, then, it would seem that the a priori principles of two powers of the mind, the power of cognition and that of desire, have now mean what is in agreement or conflict with a merely possible practical precept (as, say, the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics), but the second, what stands in such a relation to a law actually residing in reason as such; and this distinction in meaning, although somewhat unusual, is not entirely foreign even to the ordinary use of language. Thus, e.g., to an orator, as such, it is not permitted to coin new words or constructions; to a poet this is to some extent permitted. In neither of these two [cases] is one thinking of duty. For if someone wants to forfeit his reputation as an orator, no one can bar him from doing it. The concern here is only with the distinction of imperatives in terms of a problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic determining basis. Similarly, in the note where I contrasted the moral ideas of practical perfection in different philosophical schools, I distinguished the idea of wisdom from that of holiness, although I myself have declared them to be basically and objectively one and the same. In that note, however, I mean by wisdom only that wisdom to which the human being (the Stoic) lays claim, hence wisdom attributed to the human being subjectively [and] fictitiously as a property. (Perhaps the expression virtue, which the Stoic also paraded, might designate better what is characteristic of his school.) But most of all the expression, postulate of pure practical reason, was capable of occasioning misinterpretation, if confused with the meaning that postulates of pure mathematics have, which carry with them apodeictic certainty. However, the latter postulate the possibility of an action whose object has previously with complete certainty been cognized theoretically a priori as possible. The postulate of pure practical reason, on the other hand, postulates the possibility of an object itself (God and the immortality of the soul) from apodeictic practical laws, and therefore only on behalf of a practical reason. This certainty of the postulated possibility is thus not at all theoretical, hence also not apodeictic, i.e., a necessity cognized with regard to the object, but is, rather, an assumption necessary, with regard to the subject, for complying with practical reason's objective but practical laws, hence merely a necessary hypothesis. I could not find a better expression for this subjective but nonetheless unconditioned necessity.

\[ \text{[See below, Ak. V, 65–67.]} \]
\[ \text{[Kant's point here, at least in part, is that in ordinary German unerlaubt—just like 'not permitted' in ordinary English—means not merely 'permission has not been given' but, in effect, 'forbidden' or 'prohibited.' By the same token, translating the German term as either of these latter terms would obscure Kant's point. For the table that Kant has just mentioned, see below, Ak. V, 66.]} \]
\[ \text{[Beziehung.]} \]
\[ \text{[unter.]} \]
\[ \text{[Bestimmungsgrund.]} \]
\[ \text{[See below, Ak. V, 127 n. 151.]} \]
\[ \text{'attributed fictitiously' translates angedichtet.} \]
been ascertained and determined as to the conditions, range, and bounds of their use, and that a secure basis has been laid for a systematic theoretical as well as practical philosophy as science.

However, presumably nothing worse could befall these endeavors than that someone should make the unexpected discovery that there is and can be no a priori cognition at all. But there is no danger of this. It would be tantamount to someone’s wishing to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we say that we cognize something by reason only when we are conscious that we could have known it even if we had not encountered it thus in experience; hence reason’s cognition and a priori cognition are one and the same. It is a direct contradiction to try to squeeze necessity out of an experiential proposition (ex pumice aquam), and to try to impart to a judgment, along with this necessity, also true universality (without which no inference of reason [is possible], and hence also no inference by analogy,

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94 ['it would seem that . . . have now been' renders wären . . . nunmehr.]

95 [Kant is referring to Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821), the author of Über Raum und Caussalität, zur Prüfung der Kantischen Philosophie (Göttingen: Johann Christian Dietrich, 1787; reprinted, Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1968). In a letter to Christian Gottfried Schütz (1747–1832) dated June 25, 1787 (Ak. X, 490 [second edition of Kant’s Correspondence; in the first edition the page is 467]), Kant says, “Better than any controversies with Feder and Abel [Jacob Friedrich von Abel (1751–1829), another critic of Kant] (the former of whom maintains that there is no a priori cognition at all . . . ), this Critique will prove and make graspable that pure practical reason is possible, and that it compensates for what I denied to speculative reason . . . .” Feder is also the editor who wrote a notorious revision of an already shoddy review by Christian Garve (1742–98) of Kant’s first Critique and published it in the supplement (Zugaben) to the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, i.e., Göttingen Scholarly Announcements, on January 19, 1782 (item 3, 40–48; reprinted as Attachment [Beilage] II in the Philosophische Bibliothek edition of Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (vol. 40, 167–74). Kant’s reply to that review is contained in the Appendix (Anhang) to the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 371–83.]

96 [Erfahrungs-. In Kant, ‘experiential’ is not synonymous with ‘empirical.’ Whereas experience is indeed empirical (insofar as it includes sensation), perception (which includes sensation) is empirical (viz., empirical intuition) without as yet being experience. In order for perception to become experience, it must be given the synthetic unity provided by the understanding’s categories. See the Critique of Pure Reason, B 422n, A 183/B 226 (cf. B vii, 12, 161), and the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 297–98.]

97 ['Water from a pumice stone.' The quote—more fully, aquam a pumice nunc postulas, i.e., 'you now demand water from a pumice stone [namely, money from a pauper]’—is from Persa (The Persian), I, i, 41, by Titus Maccius Plautus (c. 250–184 B.C.), Roman comic dramatist.]
which is an at least presumed universality and objective necessity and therefore does always presuppose it\(^98\). To substitute subjective necessity—i.e., habit\(^99\)—for objective\(^100\) necessity, which occurs only in a priori judgments, is to deny to reason the ability to make a judgment about the object,\(^101\) i.e., to cognize it and what belongs to it. For example, it is to say, concerning what repeatedly and always follows upon a certain prior state, not that one can infer it from that state (for this would mean objective necessity and the concept of an a priori linkage), but only that one may (in a way similar to animals) expect similar cases; i.e., it is to repudiate the concept of cause basically as false and a mere deception of thought.\(^102\) As for trying to remedy this lack of objective and therefore universal validity by saying that, after all, one sees no basis for attributing to other rational beings a different way of presenting,\(^103\) if that attempt yielded a valid inference, then our ignorance would render us greater services for expanding our cognition than any meditation. For merely because we are not familiar with\(^104\) rational beings other than the human being, we would have a right to assume them to be constituted just as we cognize ourselves to be,\(^105\) i.e., we actually would be familiar with them. I am not even mentioning here that universality of assent\(^106\) does not prove a judgment’s objective validity (i.e., its validity as cognition). I am saying, rather, that even if that universal assent\(^107\) were contingently correct, this could still not yield a proof of [its] agreement\(^108\) with the object, but that, on the contrary, objective validity alone amounts to the basis of a necessary universal agreement.

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\(^{98}\) [I.e., does always presuppose (true) universality and (thus) objective necessity: *diese.*]

\(^{99}\) [Or ‘custom’: *Gewohnheit.*]

\(^{100}\) [*objektiv.*]

\(^{101}\) [*Gegenstand*, which Kant uses interchangeably with *Objekt.*]

\(^{102}\) [See below, Ak. V, 50–57.]

\(^{103}\) [Or ‘kind of presentation’: *Vorstellungsart.*]

\(^{104}\) [*kennen*. See below, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120.]

\(^{105}\) [Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 290n.]

\(^{106}\) [Literally, ‘of considering-true’: *des Fürwahrhaltens.*]

\(^{107}\) [*jene*, which strictly speaking refers to ‘universality of assent.’]

\(^{108}\) [*Übereinstimmung* here, *Einstimmung* below.]
Hume also would be quite comfortable with this system of the universal empiricism concerning principles. For, as is familiar, he demanded nothing more than that, instead of any objective meaning of necessity in the concept of cause, a merely subjective meaning be assumed, viz., habit, in order to deny to reason any judgment about God, freedom, and immortality; and, provided that the principles were granted to him, he certainly knew very well how to draw inferences from them with all logical cogency. But even Hume did not make empiricism so universal as to include in it mathematics also. He considered the propositions of mathematics to be analytic; and if this were correct, they would indeed also be apodeictic, yet no inference could be drawn from this to an ability of reason to make apodeictic judgments in philosophy as well, viz., such as would be synthetic (as [e.g.] the principle of causality). However, if the empiricism concerning principles were assumed [as] universal, then mathematics too would be implicated in it.

109 [David Hume (1711–76), Scottish empiricist philosopher, historian, economist, essayist, and author of numerous works. Hume’s empiricism is one of the two major philosophical traditions to which Kant’s philosophy responds—the other being the rationalism of Leibniz, especially as developed by Christian Wolff. (Kant credits Hume with having awakened him from his “dogmatic slumber,” which had been induced by that rationalism.) Hume’s most important philosophical works are A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J. Noon, 1739–40); contemporary edition: edited, with an analytical index, by L.A. Selby–Bigge; 2nd ed. with text rev. and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); and the Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (later renamed to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) (London: A. Millar, 1748); contemporary edition: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh; An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature; edited and introduced by Eric Steinberg; 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1993).]

110 [Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 760–69 = B 788–97.]

111 [Sätze. Sometimes Satz means ‘principle’ instead; see below.]

112 [Or ‘power’: Vermögen.]

113 [Satz.]

114 [On this whole paragraph, cf. below, Ak. V, 50–57. As regards Hume’s views on the propositions of mathematics, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Sect. IV, Pt. I), he does indeed hold that the propositions of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic express “relations of ideas,” i.e., to use Kant’s term, they are analytic. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume had considered (Bk. I, Pt. III, Sect. I) the propositions of geometry, though not those of algebra and arithmetic, to be empirical and thus, to use Kant’s term, synthetic. However, Kant became familiar with the Treatise (it is not known when) only indirectly, through citations (translated into German) from James Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposi-
Now if mathematics comes into conflict with that reason which admits only empirical principles,\(^{115}\) as is unavoidable in the antinomy where mathematics proves incontestably the infinite divisibility of space but empiricism cannot permit this infinite divisibility,\(^ {116}\) then the greatest possible evidence of demonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged inferences from experiential principles;\(^ {117}\) and now one cannot help asking, like Cheselden's blind man, Which deceives me, sight or touch [feeling]?\(^ {118}\) (For empiricism is based on a felt necessity, but rationalism on a necessity into which one has insight.) And thus universal empiricism reveals itself as genuine skepticism, which has falsely been ascribed to Hume in such an unlimited meaning;\(^ {119}\) for, with mathematics, he left us at least one secure touchstone of experience, whereas genuine skepticism permits absolutely\(^ {120}\) no such touchstone (which can never be encountered except in a priori principles) even though experience consists indeed not of mere feelings, but also of judgments.

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\(^ {115}\) [empirische Grundsätze.]


\(^ {117}\) [Erfahrungsprinzipien.]

\(^ {118}\) [William Cheselden (1688–1752), an English anatomist and surgeon who succeeded in curing certain forms of blindness, reported the reaction of one of his patients in Philosophical Transactions, XXXV (1728), 447. Kant's source for this report probably was a work on optics by Robert Smith (1689–1768), A Compleat System of Opticks (Cambridge: Printed for the author, sold by Cornelius Crownfield, 1738), as translated and adapted by Abraham Gotthelf Kästner (1719–1800) as Vollständiger Lehrbegriff der Optik (Altenburg: Richterische Buchhandlung, 1755).]

\(^ {119}\) Names designating the adherents of a sect have at all times carried with them much perversion of justice, roughly as if someone said, N is an idealist. For although he definitely not only concedes but insists that for our presentations of external things there are corresponding actual objects as external things,\(^ {a}\) he nonetheless wants the forms of intuition of these [objects] to attach not to them but only to the human mind.\(^ {b}\)

\(^ {a}\) [Literally, Kant says 'actual objects of external things': wirkliche Gegenstände äußerer Dinge.]

\(^ {b}\) [On this entire note, which is probably directed against the mentioned Feder-Garve review of the first Critique, cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 375n and 376n.]

\(^ {120}\) [schlechterdings.]
Since, however, in this philosophical and critical age such an empiricism can scarcely be taken seriously, and is presumably being put forth only as an exercise for judgment and in order to put the necessity of rational a priori principles in a clearer light by contrast, one may still be grateful to those who want to take the trouble to do this otherwise indeed uninstructive work.
INTRODUCTION

On the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason

The theoretical use of reason dealt with objects of the cognitive power alone, and a critique of reason with regard to this use concerned in fact only the pure cognitive power, because this power raised the suspicion—which was indeed confirmed thereafter—that it might easily stray beyond its bounds, losing itself among unattainable objects or even among concepts conflicting with one another. With the practical use of reason the situation is indeed different. In this use, reason deals with determining bases\textsuperscript{121} of the will, which is a power either to produce objects corresponding to one’s presentations, or, at any rate, to determine itself to bring about these objects (whether or not one’s physical power is sufficient), i.e., to determine its causality. For there reason can at least succeed in determining the will and, insofar as volition\textsuperscript{122} alone is at issue, always has objective reality. Here, therefore, the first question is whether pure reason is sufficient by itself alone to determine the will, or whether reason\textsuperscript{123} can be a determining basis of the will\textsuperscript{124} only as empirically conditioned. Now at this point there enters a concept of causality justified by the Critique of Pure Reason although incapable of being exhibited empirically, viz., the concept of freedom; and if we can now discover grounds for proving that this property does in fact be-

\textsuperscript{121}[Bestimmungsgründe.]

\textsuperscript{122}[Literally, ‘the willing’: das Wollen.]

\textsuperscript{123}[Kant actually says sie, which strictly grammatically—but incorrectly—refers back to pure reason.]

\textsuperscript{124}[Reading, with Gustav Hartenstein, desselben for derselben.]
long to the human will (and thus also to the will of all rational beings), then this establishes not only that pure reason can be practical, but that it alone, and not the empirically limited reason, is unconditionally practical. Consequently we shall have to work on a critique not of pure practical, but only of practical reason as such. For pure [practical] reason, once one has established that there is such a reason, needs no critique. It itself is what contains the standard for the critique of all its use. Hence the critique of practical reason as such has the obligation to keep the empirically conditioned reason from presuming to seek to provide, alone and exclusively, the determining basis of the will. The use of pure [practical] reason, if one has established that there is such a reason, is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use [of practical reason] that presumes to be sole ruler is, on the contrary, transcendent and expresses itself in demands and in commands that go entirely beyond that reason's domain—which is exactly the inverse relation of the one that we were able to state concerning pure reason in its speculative use.

However, since it is still pure reason whose cognition here lies at the basis of reason’s practical use, the division of a critique of practical reason will nonetheless have to be arranged, in its general outline, in conformity with that of the critique of speculative reason. Hence we shall have to have in this critique a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Method; and within the former an Analytic, as rule of truth, as the first part, and a Dialectic as exhibition and resolution of the illusion in judgments of practical reason. Only the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will once again be the inverse of that in the critique of pure speculative reason. For in the present critique we shall, starting from principles, proceed to concepts and

125 [See below, Ak. V, 42–57.]
126 [Cf. the first paragraph of Kant’s Preface, Ak. V, 3.]
127 [Obliegenheit, which is a synonym of Verbindlichkeit.]
128 [See below, Ak. V, 22–26.]
129 [I.e., keeps within the limits of possible experience. For the distinction between ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ (below), see the Critique of Pure Reason, A 295–96/B 352–53, cf. A 326/B 383, A 643 = B 671, A 799 = B 827.]
130 [Zumutungen.]
131 [See below, Ak. V, 89–106.]
132 [des Scheins.]
133 [Cf. below, Ak. V, 90.]
only then, if possible, from these to the senses, whereas in the case of speculative reason we started from the senses and had to end with the principles. Now, the basis for this lies again in this: that we are now concerned with a will and have to examine reason not in relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality; and thus the principles of the empirically unconditioned causality must come at the beginning,\textsuperscript{134} and only thereafter can the attempt be made to establish our concepts of the determining basis of such a will, of their application to objects\textsuperscript{135} and finally to the subject and his sensibility.\textsuperscript{136} The law of the causality from freedom, i.e., some pure practical principle, here unavoidably comes at the beginning and determines the objects to which alone it can be referred.

\textsuperscript{134} [See Chapter I below, Ak. V, 19–57.]

\textsuperscript{135} [See Chapter II below, Ak. V, 57–71.]

\textsuperscript{136} [See Chapter III below, Ak. V, 71–106.]
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

PART I

DOCTRINE OF THE ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
Practical principles are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, if the condition [under which they apply] is regarded by the subject as valid only for his will; but they are objective, or practical laws, if the condition is cognized as objective, i.e., as valid for the will of every rational being.

Comment

If one assumes that pure reason can contain within itself a basis that is sufficient practically, i.e., sufficient to determine the will, then there are practical laws; but if not, then all practical principles will be mere maxims. In a

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1 [Erklärung. This term has a variety of different meanings; see the Critique of Pure Reason, A 730 = B 758. Sometimes, including here, it could legitimately be rendered as 'definition' instead of as 'explication,' but I prefer to reserve 'definition' for the German term Definition in order to enable the reader to identify Kant's uses of this latter term.]
2 [Grundsätze, the literal meaning of which is 'basic propositions.']
3 [allgemein, which can also mean 'universal.]
4 [I.e., if (wo) one does not make that assumption.]
pathologically affected will\textsuperscript{5} of a rational being one can find a conflict of maxims with the practical laws cognized by that being himself.\textsuperscript{6} For example, someone can make it his maxim to endure no affront unavenged and yet at the same time see\textsuperscript{7} that this is not a practical law but only his maxim, and that, on the contrary, as a rule for the will of every rational being it could not—in one and the same maxim—harmonize\textsuperscript{8} with itself.

In the cognition of nature the principles of what occurs (e.g., the principle of the equality of action and reaction\textsuperscript{9} in the communication of motion) are at the same time laws of nature;\textsuperscript{10} for there the use of reason is theoretical and determined by the constitution of the object. In practical cognition—i.e., cognition that deals merely with determining bases of the will—principles that one makes for oneself are not yet, on that account, laws by which one is unavoidably bound,\textsuperscript{11} because in the practical [sphere] reason deals with the subject, namely with his power of desire,\textsuperscript{12} to whose particular constitution the rule can multifariously conform. A practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes\textsuperscript{13} action\textsuperscript{14} as a means to an effect that is the aim.\textsuperscript{15} However, for a being in whom reason is not the sole determining basis of the will, this rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule which is designated by an ought,\textsuperscript{16} expressing the ob-

\textsuperscript{5} I.e., in a will affected by motivating causes of sensibility (see the Critique of Pure Reason, A 534 = B 562, cf. A 802 = B 830, as well as below, Ak. V, 80, 120), which as such are subjective (Ak. V, 79, 32) and physical (Ak. V, 44).

\textsuperscript{6} Following Kant, I use 'it' with 'being' and 'creature,' but 'he' with 'human being' and 'subject,' despite the neuter gender of the German expressions. But unlike Kant, I also use—to preserve clarity—he when the being or creature in question is said or implied to be rational.

\textsuperscript{7} Literally, 'have insight': einsehen.

\textsuperscript{8} zusammenstimen.

\textsuperscript{9} Gleichheit der Wirkung und Gegenwirkung.

\textsuperscript{10} Cf. the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ak. IV, 544-51.

\textsuperscript{11} More literally, 'laws to which one is unavoidably subject': darunter man unvermeidlich steht.

\textsuperscript{12} Begehrungsvermögen.

\textsuperscript{13} vorschreiben—the corresponding noun being Vorschrift.

\textsuperscript{14} Handlung.

\textsuperscript{15} Absicht.

\textsuperscript{16} [Emphasis added.]
jective necessitation\textsuperscript{17} of the action, and which signifies that if reason entirely determined the will then the action would unfailingly occur in accordance with this rule. Hence imperatives hold objectively and are entirely distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles\textsuperscript{18}. Imperatives, however, either determine the conditions of the causality of a rational being—as an efficient cause—merely in regard to the effect and the [causality’s] adequacy to it; or they determine only the will, whether or not it is sufficient for the effect. The first would be hypothetical imperatives and would contain mere precepts\textsuperscript{19} of skill; the second, on the contrary, would be categorical and would alone be practical laws.\textsuperscript{20} Hence maxims are indeed principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives themselves, however, when they are conditional—i.e., when they determine the will not absolutely\textsuperscript{21} as will but only in regard to a desired effect, i.e., when they are hypothetical imperatives—are indeed practical precepts, but not laws.\textsuperscript{22} Laws must sufficiently determine the will as will even before I ask whether I do perhaps have the ability required for a desired effect, or what I am to do in order to produce it. Hence they must be categorical; otherwise they are not laws, for they lack the necessity which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of conditions that are pathological and that hence adhere to the will contingently. Tell someone, for example, that he must work and save in his youth in order not to want in his old age. This is a correct and at the same time important practical precept of the will. We readily see, however, that the will is here being directed to something else that one is presupposing to be desired by it; and this desire must be left to him, the agent himself, whether he foresees further resources apart from the assets acquired by himself, or whether perhaps he does not hope to grow old, or thinks that in case of future need he can manage [by living] plainly. Reason, from which alone can arise any rule that is to contain necessity, does indeed put necessity also into this its precept (for without it the precept would not be an imperative), but this neces-

\textsuperscript{17} [\textit{Nötigung}. The corresponding verb is \textit{nötigen}, which Kant himself equates with \textit{nötigen} (\textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 222). However, since the English ‘to necessitate’ is unsuitable (very awkward, at best) in most contexts, I use ‘to compel’ instead.]

\textsuperscript{18} [Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 420–21n.]

\textsuperscript{19} [\textit{Vorschriften}.]

\textsuperscript{20} [Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 414–16.]

\textsuperscript{21} [\textit{schlechthin}.]

\textsuperscript{22} [\textit{Gesetze}.]
sity is conditioned only subjectively and cannot be presupposed to the same
degree in all subjects. For reason's legislation,\textsuperscript{23} however, it is requisite that
reason need presuppose merely \textit{itself}, because the rule [it gives] is objec-
tively and universally valid only when it holds without contingent, subjec-
tive conditions, which distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell
someone that he ought never to make a lying promise. This is a rule that
pertains merely to his will, whether or not the aims that the human being
may have can be achieved by this will. The mere volition is what is to be de-
termined by this rule completely a priori. If, now, it is found that this rule is
practically correct, then it is a law, because it is a categorical imperative.
Therefore practical laws refer solely to the will, without regard to what is
accomplished through its causality, and one can abstract from this causality
(as belonging to the world of sense) in order to have them pure.

\section*{§ 2}
\textbf{THEOREM I}

All practical principles that presuppose an \textit{object}\textsuperscript{24} (matter) of the power of
desire as determining basis of the will\textsuperscript{25} are, one and all, empirical and cannot provide any practical laws.

By the matter of the power of desire I mean an object whose actuality is
desired. Now if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule and is
the condition for making the rule one's principle, then, I say (\textit{first}), the prin-
ciple is always empirical. For the determining basis of the power of choice\textsuperscript{26} is then the presentation\textsuperscript{27} of an object and [also] that relation of the
presentation to the subject by which the power of desire is determined to

\textsuperscript{23} [I.e., lawgiving (not the product thereof): \textit{Gesetzgebung}. I am refraining from translating
this term as 'lawgiving' because this rendering does not work in all contexts, and because it
would also obscure the link between the German noun and \textit{gesetzgebend}, for which (likewise)
no term but 'legislative' works consistently.]

\textsuperscript{24} [\textit{Objekt} here, \textit{Gegenstand} below. Kant uses the two terms interchangeably.]

\textsuperscript{25} [\textit{Wille}.]

\textsuperscript{26} [\textit{Willkür}, the root meaning of which is 'will-choice.' On \textit{Wille} and \textit{Willkür}; cf. the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 213–14, 226, and the \textit{Critique of Judgment}, Ak. V, 172. On the
power of choice, see also the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A 534 = B 562, A 549–50 = B 577–78,
A 552–53 = B 580–81, A 800 = B 828, A 802 = B 830.]

\textsuperscript{27} [\textit{Vorstellung}.]
make the object actual. Such a relation to the subject, however, is called *pleasure* in the actuality of an object.\(^{28}\) Therefore this pleasure would have to be presupposed as condition for the possibility of the determination of the power of choice. However, one cannot cognize a priori concerning any presentation of some object, whatever the presentation may be, whether it will be linked with *pleasure* or *displeasure* or be *indifferent*. Therefore in such a case the determining basis of the power of choice must always be empirical, and hence so must be the practical material principle that presupposed it as a condition.

Now (second), a principle that is based only on the subjective condition of receptivity to a pleasure or displeasure ([a receptivity] which can always be cognized only empirically and cannot be valid in the same way for all rational beings) can indeed serve the subject—who possesses this receptivity—as his *maxim*, but it cannot serve even the subject himself\(^{29}\) as a *law* (because it is lacking in objective necessity, which must be cognized a priori); and hence such a principle can never provide a practical law.

\[\text{§ 3}
\]

**THEOREM II**

All material principles—as such—are, one and all, of one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self-love or one's own happiness.

Pleasure from the existence\(^{30}\) of a thing, insofar as it is to be a determining basis of desire for this thing, is based on the *receptivity* of the subject, because it *depends* on the existence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling) and not to understanding, [a term] which expresses a referring of a presentation *to an object* according to concepts, but not to the subject according to feelings. Therefore pleasure is practical only insofar as the sensation\(^{31}\) of agreeableness that the subject expects from the object’s actuality

\(^{28}\) [Cf. the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 211–12.]

\(^{29}\) [Reading, with Emil Wille, *seiner...dieses für ihrer...diese*.]

\(^{30}\) [Existenz here, *Dasein* below.]

\(^{31}\) [*Empfindung*. This term (similarly for *empfinden*, ‘to sense,’ near the end of the present paragraph), like its English equivalent, can refer either to a sensation involving one of the senses, or to a feeling (*Gefühl*). Kant sometimes attempts to restrict the term to the first of these meanings, most explicitly in the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 205–06, cf. 295; cf. also the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 400, and the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 153. But he does not
determines his power of desire. However, a rational being’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life as uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is *happiness*, and the principle whereby one makes happiness the highest determining basis of the power of choice is the principle of self-love. Hence all material principles, which posit the determining basis of the power of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be sensed from the actuality of some object, are entirely of the same kind insofar as they belong, one and all, to the principle of self-love or one’s own happiness.

**COROLLARY**

All material practical rules posit the determining basis of the will in our lower power of desire, and if there were no merely formal laws of the will that sufficiently determined it, then one also could not admit any higher power of desire.

**Comment I**

It is surprising how otherwise acute men can believe that they find a distinction between the lower and the higher power of desire according to whether the presentations linked with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses or in understanding. For if one inquires about the determining bases of desire and posits them in an agreeableness expected from something or other, then it does not matter at all where the presentation of this gratifying object comes from, but only how much the presentation gratifies. If a presentation, even though it may have its seat and origin in the understanding, can determine the power of choice only by presupposing a feeling of a pleasure in the subject, then its being a determining basis of the
power of choice depends entirely on the constitution of inner sense, viz.,
[on the fact] that this sense can be affected with agreeableness by that pre-
sentation. However different in kind the presentations of objects may be—
whether they be presentations of understanding or even of reason, in con-
trast to presentations of the senses—the feeling of pleasure by which alone
they properly amount to the determining basis of the will (the agreeableness,
the gratification that one expects from them and that impels the activity
to produce the object) is nonetheless of the same kind. It is so not only
insofar as it can always be cognized merely empirically, but also insofar as
it affects one and the same vital force manifesting itself in our power of de-
sire, and in this regard can differ from any other determining basis in noth-
ing but degree. How, otherwise, could one make a comparison in magnitude
between two determining bases entirely different in terms of the kind of presen-
tation [involved], in order to prefer the one that most affects one’s
power of desire? The same human being can return an instructive book,
available to him only once, in order not to miss the hunt; he can leave in the
middle of a beautiful speech in order not to be late for a meal; he can aban-
don an entertainment [marked] by rational conversations, which he other-
wise greatly esteems, in order to sit down at the gambling table; he can even
turn away a pauper to whom ordinarily he is glad to be charitable, because
he happens to have no more money in his pocket than he needs in order to
pay for admission to the theater. If the determination of the will rests on
the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from some
cause, then it is all the same to him by what kind of presentation he is
affected. All that concerns him, in order to decide on a choice, is how in-
tense, how long, how easily acquired, and how often repeated this agree-
ableness is. Just as, to someone who needs gold [coins] for his expenditure
it is all the same whether the material therein, the gold, was dug from the
mountains or washed from the sand, provided it is accepted everywhere at
the same value, so no one asks, when he is concerned merely with the
agreeableness of life, whether presentations of understanding or of sense
[furnish him with gratification,] but only how much and how great is the
gratification they furnish him for the longest time. Only those who would

33 [Cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 377–78.]
34 [sonst.]
35 [Komödie, in an older and broader meaning of the term.]
36 [Wahl.]
like to deny to pure reason the ability to determine the will without the pre-supposition of some feeling can stray so far—from their own explication—that what they have themselves previously brought under one and the same principle they nonetheless explicate thereafter as entirely different in kind. Thus we find, e.g., that one can find gratification also in the mere application of strength, in the consciousness of one’s fortitude of soul in overcoming obstacles opposing one’s project, in the cultivation of spiritual talents, etc.; and we rightly call these the more refined joys and delights, because they are more under our control than others, do not wear out, but rather fortify our feeling for still further enjoyment of them, and in delighting us they at the same time cultivate us. Yet to pass them off, on that account, as a way of determining the will different from that by mere sense, even though for the possibility of those gratifications they do presuppose in us, as the primary condition of this liking, a feeling aimed at them, [is a mistake]; it is just as when ignorant people who would like to dabble in metaphysics think of matter as so refined—so overrefined—that they could themselves get dizzy from it, and then believe that in this way they have devised a spiritual and yet extended being. If in the case of virtue we rely, with Epicurus, on the will’s being determined by the mere gratification that virtue promises, we cannot thereafter rebuke him for holding that this gratification is of entirely the same kind as those of the coarsest senses. For we have no basis at all for charging him with having assigned the presentations by which this feeling is aroused in us to the bodily senses only; as far as we can divine, he sought the source of many of these presentations just as much in the use of the higher cognitive power. But this did not and could not prevent him from holding, in accordance with the principle mentioned

37 [Or ‘intellectual’: Geistes-]

38 [Or ‘in our power’: in unserer Gewalt]

39 [Or ‘first’: erste]

40 [Wohlgefallen]

41 [Kant may have in mind the English philosopher and poet Henry More (1614–87), a contemporary of Sir Isaac Newton who espoused the existence of effluences, which are spiritual substances that are extended in space (whereas most thinkers claimed that spiritual substances, e.g., God, angelic intellects, human souls, etc., do not occupy space at all). Some commentators on Newton suggest that he employed such effluences in his claim—which Kant never took seriously—that God (an unextended spiritual substance) is the ultimate cause of the gravitational attraction of all bodies for one another through the agency of effluences that are active in all the regions of space.]
above, that the gratification itself which those—even if intellectual—pre-
sentations afford us and by which alone they can be determining bases of
the will is of entirely the same kind. To be consistent is the greatest obliga-
tion of a philosopher, and yet [consistency] is most rarely encountered. The
ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than we encounter in our
syncretistic age, where a certain coalition system of contradictory prin-
ciples is contrived—[a system] full of insincerity and shallowness—because
it commends itself better to a public that is satisfied to know something of
everything, and on the whole nothing, while yet being fit for anything. The
principle of one’s own happiness, however much understanding and reason
may be used with this principle, would still comprise no determining bases
for the will different from those that are appropriate to our lower power of
desire; and thus either there is no higher power of desire at all, or pure
reason must be practical by itself alone, i.e., it must be able to determine the
will by the mere form of the practical rule without the presupposition of any
feeling, and hence without presentations of the agreeable or disagreeable as
the matter of the power of desire, the matter which is always an empirical
condition of principles. Only then, insofar as reason by itself determines the
will (instead of being in the service of the inclinations), is reason a true
higher power of desire, to which the pathologically determinable power of
desire is subordinate, and only then is reason actually distinct—indeed, distin-
ct in kind—from the latter power, so that even the slightest admixture
of the latter power’s impulses impairs reason’s fortitude and superiority,
just as the slightest empirical [component] as condition in a mathematical
demonstration degrades and annihilates the demonstration’s dignity and
force. In a practical law reason determines the will directly, not by
means of an intervening feeling of pleasure and displeasure, not even [one

42 ['higher' (oberes) inserted by Kant in his working copy.]

43 [spezifisch unterschieden.]

44 [Abbruch tut. An appropriate alternative rendering for this expression would be ‘infringes’;
‘infringes upon,’ on the other hand, is slightly weaker than what Kant has in mind, as is most
evident in contexts in which Abbruch tut is paired with the comparably graphic niederschlagen,
i.e., ‘to strike down’: see Ak. V, 73, also 78, and cf. 37–38; cf. also the Critique of Pure Rea-
son, A 134/B 173, A 274/B 330, A 545 = B 573, A 570 = B 598, A 714 = B 742, A 776 =
B 804, A 851 = B 879. Since ‘to infringe’ is now rarely used without ‘upon,’ it seems to me that
‘to impair’ is preferable.]

45 [Cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 376–77.]

46 [unmittelbar.]
taken] in this law, and only [the fact] that reason can be practical as pure reason makes it possible for it to be legislative.

Comment II

To be happy is necessarily the longing\(^{47}\) of every rational but finite being, and hence is an unavoidable determining basis of its power of desire. For [the being's] satisfaction with its own existence is by no means an original possession and a bliss, a bliss that would presuppose [in the being] a consciousness of its independent self-sufficiency. Rather, this satisfaction is a problem\(^{48}\) thrust upon the being by its finite nature itself; for the being is needy, and this need pertains to the matter of its power of desire, i.e., to something that refers to a subjectively underlying feeling of pleasure or displeasure which determines what the being needs in order to be satisfied with its [own] state. But precisely because this material determining basis can be cognized by the subject only empirically, this problem cannot possibly be regarded as a law, because a law, as objective, would have to contain the same\(^{49}\) determining basis of the will in all cases and for all rational beings. For although the concept of happiness everywhere underlies the practical reference of objects to the power of desire, it is still only the general\(^{50}\) heading for subjective determining bases and determines nothing specifically, even though this specific determination is the sole concern in this practical problem and without it the problem cannot be solved at all. For in what each [subject] has to posit his happiness hinges\(^{51}\) on everyone's particular feeling of pleasure and displeasure and, even in one and the same subject, on the difference of the need according to the modifications of this feeling. Therefore a law that is subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very contingent practical principle that can and must be very different in different subjects. Hence it can never yield a [practical] law, because, in the desire for happiness, what counts is not the form of lawfulness

\(^{47}\) [Verlangen, which can also mean 'demand. ']

\(^{48}\) [Problem here, Aufgabe in the next two sentences.]

\(^{49}\) [eben denselben. Here—and in similar constructions elsewhere—Kant adds eben not in order to add force to 'the same' (as in 'the very same') but because in Kant's German derselbe, dieselbe, etc., are standardly used simply as pronouns referring back to some earlier noun (cf. the similar use of 'the same' in English legal jargon).]

\(^{50}\) [allgemein, which most often—e.g., later in this paragraph—is translated as 'universal. ']

\(^{51}\) [ankommen.]
but solely the matter, viz., whether in complying with the law I am to expect gratification, and how much. Principles of self-love can indeed contain universal rules of skill (for discovering means to [one’s] aims), but then they are merely theoretical principles\(^{52}\) (e.g., how someone who would like to eat bread has to devise a mill). But practical precepts that are based on them can never be universal; for the determining basis of the power of desire is [then] based on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and this feeling can never be assumed to be directed universally to the same objects.

But suppose that finite rational beings did think thoroughly alike also in regard to what they had to assume as objects of their feelings of gratification and pain, and likewise even in regard to the means they have to employ in order to attain the former objects and keep the others away. Even then they definitely could not pass off the principle of self-love as a practical law, because this agreement itself would still be only contingent. The determining basis would still be only subjectively valid and merely empirical and would not have that necessity which is thought in every law. I.e., it would not have the objective necessity from a priori bases, unless this necessity were passed off as not practical at all but as physical, viz., [by claiming] that the action is just as unfailingly forced from us by our inclination as is yawning when we see others yawn. One could sooner maintain that there are no practical laws at all but only counsels on behalf of our desires, than that merely subjective principles are being elevated to the rank of practical laws, which definitely must have objective and not merely subjective necessity and which must be cognized a priori by reason, not cognized by experience (however empirically universal this experience may be). Even the rules of accordant appearances are called laws of nature (e.g., the mechanical laws) only if either we actually cognize them a priori, or, at any rate (as with the chemical laws), we assume that we would cognize them a priori from objective bases if our insight went deeper.\(^{53}\) But in the case of merely

\(^{52}\) Propositions that are called practical in mathematics or natural science should properly be named technical, for these sciences\(^a\) are not concerned with the determination of the will. These propositions indicate only the manifold—of the possible action—that is sufficient to produce a certain effect, and are therefore just as theoretical as are all propositions asserting the connection of the cause [at issue] with an effect. Thus whoever opts for the effect must also put up with being the cause.

\(^a\) [Lehren; similarly in 'natural science' above.]

\(^{53}\) [Cf. the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ak. IV, 468–69; also the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 215.]
subjective practical principles it is expressly made a condition that they must be based not on objective but on subjective conditions of the power of choice, and hence that they must always be presented only as mere maxims and never as practical laws. This latter comment seems at first glance to be mere word-splitting; however, it defines the words for the most important distinction of all that can ever be considered in practical investigations.

§ 4
THEOREM III

If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, then he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining basis of the will not by their matter but merely by their form.

The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This object either is the determining basis of the will or it is not. If it were to be the will’s determining basis, then the rule of the will would be subject to an empirical condition (viz., to the determining presentation’s relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), and consequently would not be a practical law. Now if from a law all the matter, i.e., every object of the will, is separated (as determining basis), nothing remains of the law but the mere form of a universal legislation. Therefore a rational being either cannot think of his subjectively practical principles, i.e., maxims, at the same time as universal laws at all, or he must assume that the principles’ mere form by itself alone, whereby they are fitting for universal legislation, makes them practical laws.

Comment

What form in a maxim is fitting for universal legislation, and what form is not, can be distinguished without instruction by the commonest understanding. I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my assets by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which is deceased and has left no record of it. Naturally, this is a case for my maxim.

54 [vorstellig gemacht.]
55 [I.e., Comment II.]
56 [Gesetzgebung. See above, Ak. V, 20 br. n. 23.]
Now I want only to know whether that maxim can also hold as a universal practical law. I therefore apply the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a law and I could thus indeed, at the same time, give through my maxim such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove to him to have been made. I immediately become aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself, because it would bring it about that there would be no deposit[s] at all. A practical law that I cognize as such must qualify for universal legislation; this is an identical proposition and therefore self-evident. Now if I say that my will is subject to a practical law, then I cannot cite my inclination (e.g., in the present case, my greed) as my will’s determining basis fitting for a universal practical law; for this inclination, far from being suitable for a universal legislation, rather must, in the form of a universal law, erase itself.

Thus it is odd how it could have occurred to intelligent men, [merely] because the desire for happiness and hence also the maxim whereby everyone posits this happiness as the determining basis of his will is universal, to therefore pass this maxim off as a universal practical law. For although ordinarily a universal law of nature makes everything accordant, here, if one wanted to give to the maxim the universality of a law, precisely the extreme opposite of accordance would result: the gravest conflict, and the utter annihilation of the maxim itself and of its aim. For then the will of all does not have one and the same object, but each person has his [own] object (viz., his own well-being); and although contingently this object may indeed be compatible with the aims of other people as well, who likewise direct them at themselves, it is far from being sufficient for a law, because the exceptions that one is occasionally authorized to make are endless and cannot at all be encompassed determinately in a universal rule. In this way there results a harmony similar to that depicted by a certain satirical poem on the concord of soul between a married couple who are bringing themselves to ruin: O marvelous harmony, what he wants she also wants, etc.; or to what is reported about the pledge made by King Francis I against

57 [I.e., analytic.]
58 [diese letztere. Grammatically, this could refer back to ‘desire’ instead; however, see above, Ak. V, 22 (and cf. 23–25).]
59 [Cf. the next sentence. Although Kant actually says es rather than sie, probably by anticipation of ‘law’ (Gesetz), he clearly does mean the maxim. Cf. above, Ak. V, 26.]
60 [Wohlbefinden, which—like Wohlsein—is roughly synonymous with Wohl.]
61 [I have not been able to identify this poem.]
Emperor Charles V: What my brother Charles wants to have (Milan) I also want to have. Empirical determining bases are not suitable for any universal external legislation, but just as little also for an internal one; for each person lays at the basis of inclination his [own] subject, but another person another subject; and in each subject himself now this inclination and now another is superior in influence. Discovering a law that under this condition would govern them all—viz., with accordance on all sides—is absolutely impossible.

§ 5
Problem I

Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient determining basis of a will: to find the constitution of that will which is determinable by this form alone.

Since the mere form of a law can be presented solely by reason and hence is not an object of the senses and thus also does not belong among appearances, the presentation of this form as determining basis of the will is distinct from all determining bases of events [occurring] in nature according to the law of causality, because in the case of these events the determining bases must themselves be appearances. But if, moreover, no determining basis of the will other than that universal legislative form can serve as a law for this will, then such a will must be thought as entirely independent of the natural law governing appearances in reference to one another, viz., the law of causality. Such independence, however, is called freedom in the strictest, i.e., the transcendental, meaning. Therefore a will which is such that the mere legislative form of a maxim can alone serve it as a law is a free will.

§ 6
Problem II

Supposing that a will is free: to find the law that alone is suitable for determining it necessarily.

62 [I have deleted the emphasis on Franz ('Francis') and on Karl ('Charles').]
63 [I.e., the empirical determining bases.]
Since the matter of a practical law, i.e., the object of a maxim, can never be given except empirically, but a free will—as independent of empirical conditions (i.e., conditions belonging to the world of sense)—must nonetheless be determinable, a free will must, independently of the matter of the law, nonetheless find a determining basis in the law. But the law, apart from its matter, contains nothing more than the legislative form. Therefore solely the legislative form, insofar as it is contained in the maxim, can amount to a determining basis of the will.

**Comment**

Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally refer to each other. Now, I do not ask here whether even in fact they are different, or—rather—an unconditional law is merely the self-consciousness of a practical reason and this practical reason is entirely the same as the positive concept of freedom. Instead I ask from what our cognition of the unconditionally practical starts, whether from freedom or from the practical law. It cannot start from freedom, for we can neither become conscious of freedom directly, because the first concept of it is negative, nor infer it from experience, since experience allows us to cognize only the law of appearances and hence the mechanism of nature, the exact opposite of freedom. Therefore it is the moral law of which we become conscious directly (as soon as we draft maxims of the will for ourselves), which first offers itself to us, and which—inasmuch as reason exhibits it as a determining basis not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed entirely independent of them—leads straight to the concept of freedom. But how is even the consciousness of that moral law possible? We can become conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us, and to the separating [from them] of all empirical conditions, to which that necessity points us. The concept of a pure will arises from the consciousness

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64 [I.e., they—more accurately, their concepts—are interchangeable: weisen . . . wechselweise auf einander zurück. Cf. the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 450, where Kant says that “freedom and the will’s own legislation are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts [or ‘interchangeable concepts’: Wechselbegriffe].” (Translation mine.)]

65 [Rather than merely in relation to our cognition; see below.]

66 [I.e., entirely the same as freedom under the positive concept.]

67 [Cf. the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 446–48.]
of pure practical laws, as the consciousness of a pure understanding arises from that of pure theoretical principles. That this is the true subordination of our concepts and that morality first reveals the concept of freedom to us, and hence that practical reason, with this concept, first poses the most insoluble problem to speculative reason so as to put it in the greatest perplexity through that concept, is evident already from this: since nothing in appearances can be explained on the basis of the concept of freedom, but there the guide must always consist in the mechanism of nature; since, moreover, the antinomy of pure reason, when [reason] wants to ascend to the unconditioned in the series of causes, gets [it] entangled in incomprehensibilities with the one as much as with the other, while yet the latter (mechanism) at least has its usefulness in the explanation of appearances, one would never have committed the daring deed of introducing freedom into science had not the moral law, and with it practical reason, come in and thrust this concept upon us. However, experience also confirms this order of concepts in us. Suppose someone alleges that his lustful inclination is quite irresistible to him when he encounters the favored object and the opportunity. [Ask him] whether, if in front of the house where he finds this opportunity a gallows were erected on which he would be strung up immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then conquer his inclination. One does not have to guess long what he would reply. But ask him whether, if his prince demanded, on the threat of the same prompt penalty of death, that he give false testimony against an honest man whom the prince would like to ruin under specious pretenses, he might consider it possible to overcome his love of life, however great it may be. He will perhaps not venture to assure us whether or not he would overcome that love, but he must concede without hesitation that doing so would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is conscious that he ought to do it, and he cognizes freedom within himself—the freedom with which otherwise, without the moral law, he would have remained unacquainted.

68 [Reading dem ersteren . . . dem letzteren for den ersteren . . . dem letzteren, inasmuch as the context is concerned with consciousness. Another, less plausible, alternative would be to read den ersteren . . . den letzteren: 'The concept of a pure will arises from pure practical laws, as the consciousness of a pure understanding arises from pure theoretical principles.']

69 [Here again the term is singular: Reihe.]
CHAPTER I PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

§ 7

BASIC LAW OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle of a universal legislation.

Comment

Pure geometry has postulates that are practical propositions, which, however, contain nothing more than the presupposition that one can do something if perhaps it were demanded that one should do it; and these are the only propositions of pure geometry that concern an existence [of something]. They are therefore practical rules under a problematic condition of the will. Here, however, the rule says: one ought absolutely to proceed in a certain way. The practical rule is therefore unconditional, and hence is conceived a priori as a categorical practical proposition by which the will is objectively determined absolutely and directly (by the practical rule itself, which therefore is here a law). For pure [and] in itself practical reason is here directly legislative. The will is thought as independent of empirical conditions and hence, qua pure will, as determined by the mere form of law, and this determining basis is regarded as the supreme condition of all maxims. The thing is strange enough and has no equal in all the rest of practical cognition. For the a priori thought of a possible universal legislation, a thought which is therefore merely problematic, is commanded unconditionally as a law, without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will. On the other hand, this thought is not a precept according to which an action by which a desired effect is possible should be done (for then the rule would always be physically conditioned). Rather, it is a rule that determines the will a priori merely with regard to the form of its maxims; and thus there is at least no impossibility in thinking of a law that serves merely on behalf of the subjective form of principles as [yet being] a

70 [The categorical imperative (moral law) is discussed extensively in Kant's earlier work, the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 406–45.]

71 [Gesetzgebung. See above, Ak. V, 20 br. n. 23.]

72 [solle, rendered as 'ought' below.]

73 [Or 'unconditioned': unbedingt.]

74 [als, usually rendered as 'as'; see above and below.]
determining basis through the objective form of a law as such. The consciousness of this basic law may be called a fact of reason, because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data\textsuperscript{75} of reason—e.g., from the consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given to us)—and because, rather, it thrusts itself upon us on its own as a synthetic a priori proposition not based on any intuition, whether pure or empirical. This proposition would indeed be analytic if the freedom of the will were presupposed;\textsuperscript{76} but for this, as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required, which certainly cannot be assumed here at all.\textsuperscript{77} However, in order to regard this law—without any misinterpretation—as given, one must note carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason, which thereby announces itself as originally legislative (\textit{sic volo, sic iubeo}).\textsuperscript{78}

**COROLLARY**

Pure reason is practical by itself alone and gives (to the human being) a universal law, which we call the moral law.\textsuperscript{79}

**Comment**

The previously mentioned fact is undeniable. One need only dissect the judgment which human beings make about the lawfulness of their actions:

\textsuperscript{75}[\textit{I.e., from the Latin, givens. On the fact of reason, cf. below as well as Ak. V, 6, 32, 42, 43, 47, 55, 91, 104.}]

\textsuperscript{76}[\textit{Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 446–47.}]

\textsuperscript{77}[\textit{On intellectual (original) intuition (and the intuitive understanding that would have it), see my translation of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B 138–39, 145, A 166/B 207 incl. br. n. 67, A 249–52, B 307–09, A 256/B 311–12, and A 279–80 = B 335–36, and cf. B xl incl. br. n. 144g, B 68, 135, 149. See also the \textit{Critique of Judgment}, Ak. 402–08, and cf. 418. For a discussion of how the concept of an intellectual intuition (and of an intuitive understanding) unites Kant’s three \textit{Critiques} in one system, see the Translator’s Introduction to my translation of that work, lxxxvi–cii.}]

\textsuperscript{78}[\textit{‘This I will, this I command.’ The quote is from Juvenal, \textit{Satires}, VI, 223, and is a Roman woman’s retort to her husband, who has dared to object to her demand that an innocent slave be nailed to the cross. The actual text reads, \textit{Hoc volo, sic iubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas}; i.e., ‘That [is what] I will, this I command, instead of reasoning let there be the will.’}]

\textsuperscript{79}[\textit{Sittengesetz.}]

one will always find that, whatever [their] inclination may interject, their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, nonetheless always holds the will’s maxim in an action up to the pure will, i.e., to itself inasmuch as it regards itself as practical a priori. Now, this principle of morality, precisely on account of the universality of the legislation that makes it the formal supreme determining basis of the will regardless of all subjective differences of the will [among individuals], is declared by reason at the same time to be a law for all rational beings insofar as they have a will at all, i.e., a power\textsuperscript{80} to determine their causality by the presentation of rules, hence insofar as they are capable of \textsuperscript{81}actions according to principles and consequently also according to practical a priori principles (for these alone have that necessity which reason demands for a principle). Therefore this principle of morality does not restrict itself to human beings only, but applies to all finite beings having reason and will, and indeed includes even the infinite being as supreme intelligence.\textsuperscript{82} In the case of those finite beings, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, one can indeed presuppose a pure will, but, as beings affected by needs and sensible motivating causes,\textsuperscript{83} not a holy will, i.e., a will that would not be capable of \textsuperscript{84}drafting] any maxims conflicting with the moral law. Hence in the case of those finite beings the moral law is an imperative that commands categorically because the law is unconditional.\textsuperscript{85} The relation of such a will to this law is dependence, under the name of obligation, which \textsuperscript{86}although only by reason and its objective law, to an action that is called duty. The action is called duty because a pathologically affected (although not thereby deter-

\textsuperscript{80} Or ‘ability’: Vermögen.

\textsuperscript{81} Grundsätze here, Prinzipien below and similarly earlier in this paragraph. See above, Ak. V, 7 br. n. 66.

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 412–14.

\textsuperscript{83} I.e., motivating causes of sensibility. I render Bewegursache as ‘motivating cause’ rather than as ‘motive’ in order to preserve the reference to ‘cause’ (Ursache), which is especially important in contexts where causes are explicitly discussed, as indeed they are here.

\textsuperscript{84} moralisches Gesetz here and below, Sittengesetz later in this paragraph and in the preceding Corollary. Kant uses the two expressions interchangeably.

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 412–13.

\textsuperscript{86} Nötigung. Cf. below, Ak. V, 81.
mined, and hence always also free) power of choice\textsuperscript{87} carries with it a wish that arises from \textit{subjective} causes and that hence can often be opposed to the pure objective determining basis and therefore requires, as moral necessitation, a resistance of practical reason that may be called an inner but intellectual constraint. In the most sufficient intelligence of all, the power of choice is rightly presented as not capable of [drafting] any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a law; and the concept of holiness, which on that account belongs to this power of choice, places it, not indeed beyond\textsuperscript{88} all practical laws, but still beyond all practically restricting laws, and hence beyond obligation and duty. This holiness of will is nonetheless a practical idea that must necessarily serve as an \textit{archetype}, which to approach \textit{ad infinitum} is alone incumbent upon\textsuperscript{89} all finite rational beings; and the pure moral law, which is itself called holy because of this, constantly and rightly holds this idea before their eyes. Being sure of this progression \textit{ad infinitum} of one’s maxims and sure of their immutability in [this] constant advance, i.e., virtue, is the highest [result] that finite practical reason can bring about.\textsuperscript{90} Virtue itself, in turn, at least as a naturally acquired power,\textsuperscript{91} can never be complete,\textsuperscript{92} because the assurance in such a case never becomes apodeictic certainty and, as persuasion, is very dangerous.

\section*{§ 8

\textbf{THEOREM IV}}

\textit{Autonomy} of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; any \textit{heteronomy} of the power of choice, on the other hand, not only is no basis for any obligation at all but is, rather, opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will. For the sole principle of morality consists in the independence from all matter of the law (i.e., from a desired object) and yet, at the same time, the determination of

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Willkür}. See above, Ak. V, 21 br. n. 26. On ‘pathologically affected,’ see above, Ak. V, 19 br. n. 5.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{über . . . weg}.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{zusteht}.

\textsuperscript{90} [Cf. the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 392–93, 446–47.]

\textsuperscript{91} [Or ‘ability’: \textit{Vermögen}.]

\textsuperscript{92} [Or ‘perfect’: \textit{vollendet}.]
the power of choice by the mere universal legislative form which a maxim must be capable of [having]. That independence, however, is freedom in the negative meaning, whereas this legislation—pure and, as such, practical reason's own legislation—is freedom in the positive meaning. Therefore the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom; and this [autonomy] is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can harmonize with the supreme practical law. If, therefore, the matter of volition, which can be nothing other than the object of a desire that is being linked with the law, enters into the practical law as the condition of its possibility, then there results heteronomy of the power of choice, namely dependence on the natural law of following some impulse or inclination, and the will gives to itself not the law but only the precept for rational compliance with pathological laws. But the maxim, which in this way can never contain the universally legislative form within itself, not only brings about no obligation in this way, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical reason and therefore also to the moral attitude, even if the action arising from it were to be lawful.

Comment I

Thus a practical precept that carries with it a material (hence empirical) condition must never be classed with the practical law. For the law of the pure will—which is free—places the will in a sphere entirely different from the empirical one, and the necessity expressed by the law, since it is not to be a natural necessity, can therefore consist only in formal conditions of the possibility of a law as such. Any matter of practical rules rests always on subjective conditions, which impart to them no universality for rational

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94 [Literally, 'of freedom': der Freiheit. Kant is using a limiting genitive (such as we find in 'the city of Berlin'). Cf. below, Ak. V, 87.]
95 [zusammenstimmen.]
96 [Gesinnung. I prefer 'attitude' to 'disposition' because, like the German term, it sounds somewhat more occurrent than dispositional.]
97 [I.e., law-conforming: gesetzmäßig. I render this term as 'lawful' throughout the Critique, similarly for the noun.]
98 [Reading ihnen for ihr ('it'—i.e., here, the matter), as suggested by Natorp.]
beings except merely the conditional one (in case I desire this or that, what I must then do in order to make it actual), and they all revolve about the principle of one’s own happiness. Now, it is indeed undeniable that any volition must also have an object and hence a matter. But the matter is not, just because of this, the determining basis and condition of the maxim. For if it is, then the maxim cannot be exhibited in universally legislative form, since then the expectation of the object’s existence would be the determining cause of the power of choice, and the dependence of the power of desire on some thing’s existence would have to be laid at the basis of volition—a dependence which can always be sought only in empirical conditions and hence can never provide the basis for a necessary and universal rule. Thus presumably the happiness of other beings can be the object of a rational being’s will. But if it were the maxim’s determining basis, then one would have to presuppose that we find not only a natural gratification in the well-being of others but also a need, such as the sympathetic mentality brings with it in human beings. But this need I cannot presuppose in every rational being (and in God not at all). Hence the matter of the maxim can indeed remain, but it must not be the maxim’s condition, for otherwise the maxim would not be suitable for a law. Therefore the mere form of a law, which restricts the matter, must at the same time be a basis for adding this matter to the will, but not for presupposing it. Let the matter be, for example, my own happiness. This happiness, if I attribute it to everyone (as in fact I may in the case of finite beings), can become an objective practical law only if I include in it also the happiness of others. Therefore the law to further the happiness of others arises not from the presupposition that this is an object for everyone’s power of choice, but merely from the fact that the form of universality, which reason requires as condition for giving to a maxim of self-love the objective validity of a law, becomes the determining basis of the will. Hence not the object (the happiness of others)

99 [Willkür.]
100 [Begehrungsvermögen.]
101 [wird.]
102 [fremder; ‘of others,’ below, renders anderer.]
103 [Cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 387–88, 393–94, 401–02.]
104 [Wohleisn, which—like Wohlbefinden—is roughly synonymous with Wohl.]
105 [Sinnesart.]
106 [Reading welche for welches, as suggested by both Natorp and Vorländer.]
was the determining basis of the pure will, but this determining basis was solely the mere legal\textsuperscript{107} form by which I restricted my maxim—which was based on inclination—in order to impart to the maxim the universality of a law and thus to make it adequate to pure practical reason. Solely this restriction, and not the addition of an external incentive,\textsuperscript{108} could then give rise to the concept of the \textit{obligation} to expand the maxim of my self-love to the happiness of others as well.

\textbf{Comment II}

The exact opposite of the principle of morality is [what results] when the principle of one's own happiness is made the determining basis of the will;\textsuperscript{109} in this must be included, as I have shown above, any [theory] in general whereby the determining basis that is to serve as a law is posited in anything other than the legislative form of the maxim. This conflict, however, is not merely logical, as is that between empirically conditioned rules that one might nonetheless want to elevate to necessary principles of cognition. Rather, it is practical and would utterly destroy morality were not the voice of reason in reference to the will so distinct, so incapable of being shouted down, and even for the commonest human being so perceptible. As things are, however, this [theory]\textsuperscript{110} can continue to maintain itself only in the bewildering speculations of the schools, which are audacious enough to turn a deaf ear to that heavenly voice in order to uphold a theory that does not require them to rack their brains.

Suppose that a social friend,\textsuperscript{111} whom you otherwise liked, sought to justify himself to you for having given false testimony by first pleading what he alleges to be the holy\textsuperscript{112} duty of [furthering] one's own happiness, by then enumerating all the advantages he had gained by that [action], and by pointing to the prudence he is observing in order to be secure from any dis-

\textsuperscript{107} [\textit{gesetzlich}.

\textsuperscript{108} [\textit{Triebfeder}. See below, Ak. V, 71–89, and cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 427.]

\textsuperscript{109} [Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 399, 442; also the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 387–88, 493–94.]

\textsuperscript{110} [The theory whereby the principle of one's own happiness is the determining basis of the will: \textit{sie}, used apparently by anticipation of the rest of this sentence.]

\textsuperscript{111} [\textit{Umgangsfreund}.

\textsuperscript{112} [Or 'sacred': \textit{heilig}.]
covery, even on the part of yourself, to whom he is revealing the secret solely inasmuch as he can deny it at any time; but that he then alleged, in all seriousness, that he had performed a true human duty. You would either laugh straight in his face or recoil from it all with loathing, even though, if someone has geared his principles merely to advantages of his own, you would not have the slightest objection against these guidelines. Or suppose that someone recommended to you as a steward a man to whom you can blindly entrust all your concerns, and that, in order to instill trust in you, he extolled the man as a prudent human being with a masterly understanding of his own advantage and also as a tirelessly active one who passes up no opportunity for promoting it; and that finally, lest any worries about a vulgar self-interest in the man stand in the way, he extolled the man because he understands how to live with great refinement, seeks his gratification not in the accumulation of money or in brutish opulence but in the expansion of his knowledge, in select and instructive society, even in beneficence to the needy, while otherwise he is not scrupulous as to the means (which, after all, derive their worth or lack of worth only from the purpose), and other people’s money or property are as good for this purpose as his own, provided he knows that he can use it

113 [damit.]
114 [davon.]
115 [Abscheu. Cf. below, Ak. V, 58 incl. br. n. 247.]
116 [Maßregeln.]
117 [euch. Kant is now addressing his readers in the plural; in the previous example he had spoken to the individual reader in the singular.]
118 [wirksam.]
119 [Eigennutz.]
120 [Kenntnisse. Wherever possible, I translate this term—similarly for the singular, Kenntnis—as ‘acquaintance,’ reserving ‘knowledge’ for Wissen; see above, Ak. V, 4 br. n. 31. The same applies to the verb, kennen, which I translate sometimes as ‘to be acquainted with’ but most often as ‘to be familiar with’ because the ‘acquaintance’ terminology is usually too awkward—as it does also with the participle bekannt, i.e., ‘familiar.’]
121 [Or ‘end’: Zweck. I consistently translate this term as ‘purpose’ because ‘end,’ which also has a temporal meaning, frequently creates ambiguities, most devastatingly so in the Critique of Judgment, but in the present work as well. See my article on Zweckmäßigkeit (‘purposiveness’): “How to Render Zweckmäßigkeit in Kant’s Third Critique,” in Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke S. Gram, 85–98 (Iowa City, la.: University of Iowa Press, 1982).]
122 [Literally, Kant just says ‘do it’: es . . . tun.]
without being discovered or thwarted. You would believe either that the recommending person is pulling your leg, or that he has lost his mind. So distinctly and sharply cut are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the commonest eye can in no way miss the distinction whether something belongs to the one or the other. The few comments that follow may indeed, in the case of so obvious a truth, seem superfluous, but they nonetheless serve at least to provide the judgment of common human reason with somewhat greater distinctness.

The principle of happiness can indeed yield maxims, but never maxims that would be suitable for laws of the will, even if one made universal\textsuperscript{123} happiness one’s object.\textsuperscript{124} For since cognition of this [happiness] rests on none but experiential data, because each judgment about it depends very much on each person’s opinion which is even itself very changeable, the principle of happiness can indeed give general but never universal\textsuperscript{125} rules; i.e., it can give rules that on the average are most often correct but not rules that must be valid\textsuperscript{126} always and necessarily, and hence one cannot base on it any practical laws. Precisely because an object of the power of choice is here laid at the basis of this power’s rule and hence must precede it, the rule can be referred to and based on nothing other than what one approves,\textsuperscript{127} and hence referred to and based on experience, and thus the variety of judgment must be endless. This principle, therefore, does not prescribe to all rational beings the same practical rules, even though they fall under a common heading, viz., that of happiness. The moral law, however, is thought as objectively necessary only because it is to hold\textsuperscript{128} for everyone having reason and will.

The maxim of self-love (prudence) merely counsels; the law of morality commands.\textsuperscript{129} But surely there is a great difference between what we are counseled to do and what we are obligated to do.

\textsuperscript{123}[\textit{allgemein}.

\textsuperscript{124}[Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 395–96, 399, 405, 415–16, 418–19.]

\textsuperscript{125}[Respectively, \textit{generell}, \textit{universell}.

\textsuperscript{126}[\textit{gültig}.

\textsuperscript{127}[\textit{empfiehlt}. Hartenstein instead reads \textit{empfindet} (‘senses,’ in the broad meaning of the term that includes feeling).]

\textsuperscript{128}[\textit{gelten soll}.

\textsuperscript{129}[Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 414–21.]
On the principle of the autonomy of the power of choice, what is to be done can quite easily and without hesitation be seen\(^{130}\) by the commonest understanding; under the presupposition of the heteronomy of the power of choice, what is to be done is difficult to see and requires acquaintance\(^{131}\) with the world. I.e., what [one's] duty is\(^{132}\) offers itself on its own to everyone; but what brings true, lasting advantage, if this advantage is to be extended to [one's] entire existence, is shrouded in impenetrable obscurity and requires much prudence in order that the practical rule attuned to that [aim can] be adapted even tolerably to life's purposes by means of suitable exceptions. Nonetheless, the moral law commands compliance, and indeed the most meticulous compliance, from everyone. Therefore, judging what according to it is to be done must not be so difficult that the commonest and most unpracticed understanding could not deal with this law, even without worldly prudence.

Satisfying the categorical command of morality is under everyone's control\(^{133}\) at any time; satisfying the empirically conditioned precept of happiness is only rarely possible, and is far from being possible for everyone even just in regard to one single aim. This is so because in the case of the command of morality what counts is only the maxim, which must be genuine and pure, but in the case of the precept of happiness it is also one's powers and one's physical ability\(^{134}\) to make a desired object actual. A command whereby everyone ought to seek to make himself happy would be foolish, for one never commands someone to do what already on his own he unfailingly wants to do; one would have to command him merely the guidelines\(^{135}\) [for doing so], or rather offer them to him, because he is unable to do all that he wants\(^{136}\) to do. But to command morality under the name of duty is entirely reasonable;\(^{137}\) for, first, not everyone does willingly\(^{138}\) obey.

\(^{130}\) [\textit{einzehen}.]

\(^{131}\) [Or 'familiarity': \textit{-kenntnis. See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120, and 4 br. n. 31].]

\(^{132}\) [\textit{was Pflicht sei. See Ak. V, 8 n. 83 incl. n. 83f.}]

\(^{133}\) [Or 'in everyone's power': \textit{in jedes Gewalt}.]

\(^{134}\) [\textit{die Kräfte und das physische Vermögen}.]

\(^{135}\) [\textit{Maßregeln}.]

\(^{136}\) [Or 'wills': \textit{will}; likewise at the end of the sentence.]

\(^{137}\) [\textit{vernünftig}, which I usually translate as 'rational'.]

\(^{138}\) [\textit{will . . . gerne}].
its precept when it is in conflict with inclinations; and as for the guidelines as to how he can comply with this law, here these need not be taught, since what in this regard he wants to do he is also able to do.

Someone who has lost at play can indeed be angry at himself and his imprudence; but if he is conscious of having cheated at play (even though he has gained thereby), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. Hence this law must surely be something different from the principle of one's own happiness. For having to say to oneself, I am a worthless person even though I have filled my purse, must surely have a different standard of judgment from applauding oneself and saying, I am a prudent human being, for I have enriched my coffer.

Finally, there is in the idea of our practical reason something else that accompanies the transgression of a moral law, viz., its deserving punishment. Now, surely, coming to partake of happiness cannot be linked at all with the concept of a punishment, as such. For although the person who punishes can indeed at the same time have the benign intention of directing that punishment to this purpose as well, yet it must first be justified by itself as punishment, i.e., as something merely bad, so that the punished person, even if things stopped there and he looked to no indulgence hidden behind this harshness, must himself admit that he has been dealt with rightly and that his lot is perfectly appropriate to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, there must first be justice, and this amounts to what is essential in this concept. Although benignity too can be linked with punishment, the person who deserves punishment has, according to his behavior, not the slightest cause to count on it. Therefore punishment is something physically bad that, even if it were not linked with the morally evil as a natural consequence [thereof], would still have to be linked [with it] as a conse-

139 [verachten.]
140 [Nichtswürdiger.]
141 [Strafwürdigkeit.]
142 [Strafe. This term means 'punishment' in the sense of what is inflicted—viz., something bad—on someone. The German term for 'punishment' in the sense of the act of inflicting something bad is Bestrafung.]
143 [als bloßes Übel. On Übel and 'bad,' see below, Ak. V, 59 br. n. 259.]
144 [Cf. the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. VI, 227–28, 460–61.]
145 [Aufführung.]
146 [dem moralisch Bösen. See below, Ak. V, 59 br. n. 259.]
quence according to principles of a moral legislation. Now if all crime, even without taking account of the physical consequences regarding the agent, is by itself punishable—i.e., [involves] forfeiture of happiness (at least in part)—then it would obviously be absurd to say that the crime consisted precisely in the agent's having brought a punishment upon himself by impairing his own happiness (which according to the principle of self-love would have to be the proper concept of all crime). The punishment would in this way be the basis for calling something a crime, and justice would have to consist, rather, in omitting all punishment and preventing even natural punishment. For then there would no longer be any evil in the action, because the bad things\textsuperscript{147} that ordinarily followed upon it and on account of which alone the action was called evil would now be kept away. But to regard all punishing and rewarding as being altogether only the machinery in the hands of a higher power,\textsuperscript{148} a machinery that is to serve solely to thereby put rational beings into activity toward their final aim (happiness), is very manifestly a mechanism of their will that annuls all freedom, and thus we need not dwell upon it.

Even more refined, although just as untrue, is the allegation of those who assume a certain special moral sense\textsuperscript{149} which, instead of reason, determines the moral law. According to this allegation, the consciousness of virtue would be linked directly with satisfaction and gratification, and the consciousness of vice with unease of soul and with pain. Thus these [philosophers] do, after all, stake everything on the longing\textsuperscript{150} for one's own happiness. Without here drawing on what has been said above, I want only to note the delusion\textsuperscript{151} that takes place in this. In order to conceive the vicious person as tormented with unease of mind by the consciousness of his offenses, they must conceive him already in advance as at least to some degree morally good in terms of the foremost foundation of his character, just as the person who is delighted by the consciousness of actions conforming to duty must be conceived by these [philosophers] already beforehand as virtuous. Therefore the concept of morality and duty surely had to precede any regard for this satisfaction and cannot at all be derived from it.

\textsuperscript{147} [\textit{die Übel}.]

\textsuperscript{148} [Or 'might': \textit{Macht}.]

\textsuperscript{149} [Cf. the \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. IV, 442–43.]

\textsuperscript{150} [\textit{Verlangen}, which can also mean 'demand.']

\textsuperscript{151} [\textit{Täuschung}.]
Now surely one must [already] beforehand esteem the importance of what we call duty, [and esteem] the authority\(^{152}\) of the moral law and the direct worth that compliance with it gives a person in his own eyes, in order to feel this satisfaction in the consciousness of one's own adequacy to that law\(^{153}\) and the bitter reprimand if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. Therefore one cannot feel this satisfaction or this unease of soul prior to the cognition of obligation and cannot make it the basis of obligation. One must be at least halfway an honest man already in order to be able even to frame a presentation of those sensations.\(^{154}\) For the rest, I am in no way denying that, just as the human will by virtue of freedom is directly determinable by the moral law, so also can repeated performance in conformity with this determining basis ultimately bring about subjectively a feeling of satisfaction with oneself.\(^{155}\) On the contrary, to establish and cultivate this feeling, which—properly—alone deserves\(^{156}\) to be called moral feeling, itself belongs to duty.\(^{157}\) But the concept of duty cannot be derived from it, for otherwise we would have to think of a feeling of a law \textit{qua} law\(^{158}\) and turn into an object of sensation what can only be thought by reason—which, if it is not to become a flat contradiction, would entirely annul any concept of duty and would put in its place merely a mechanical play of more refined inclinations sometimes falling into discord with the coarser.

If we now compare our \textit{formal} supreme principle\(^{159}\) of pure practical reason (as an autonomy of the will) with all hitherto [proposed] \textit{material} principles of morality, we can present in a table all the[se] others as principles by which all possible other cases are actually at the same time exhausted except for a single[,] formal case, and can thus prove, as manifest to the eye, that it is futile to look around for any other principle than the one

\(^{152}\) [\textit{Ansehen}.]

\(^{153}\) [Reading, with Vorländer, \textit{desselben} for \textit{derselben}, which would refer to duty here, even though below the original does have \textit{desselben}, and thus does there refer to the moral law.]

\(^{154}\) [In the broad meaning of the term that includes feelings: \textit{Empfindungen}. See above, Ak. V, 22 br. n. 31.]

\(^{155}\) [Cf. the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 377–78.]

\(^{156}\) [\textit{verdienen}.]

\(^{157}\) [Cf. the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 399–400.]

\(^{158}\) [\textit{eines Gesetzes als eines solchen}.]

\(^{159}\) [\textit{Grundsatz} here, \textit{Prinzipien} below. See above, Ak. V, 7 br. n. 66.]
set forth here. For, all possible determining bases of the will are either merely subjective and hence empirical, or else objective and rational; but both are either external or internal.

### Practical Material Determining Bases in the Principle of Morality Are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>external</strong></td>
<td><strong>internal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of education</td>
<td>Of perfection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(according to Montaigne)</td>
<td>(according to Wolff and the Stoics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the civil constitution</td>
<td>Of moral feeling (according to Hutcheson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(according to Mandeville)</td>
<td>Of the will of God (according to Crusius and other theological moralists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>internal</strong></td>
<td><strong>external</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of physical feeling (according to Epicurus)</td>
<td>Of perfection (according to Wolff and the Stoics)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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160 [Some information pertaining to the names that appear in Kant’s table: Epicurus (341–270 B.C.), Greek philosopher and founder of the school known as Epicureanism; in this work, see Ak. V, 40–41, 88, 111, 115–16, 120, 126–27 incl. n. 151, 141; for an introduction to Epicurus, see The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia, trans. Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson; introduction by D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1994). The Stoics, members of the school known as Stoicism (which began in the third century B.C. and lasted for approximately 500 years); in this work, see Ak. V, 11 n. 93, 40, 60, 86, 111–12, 115, 126–27 incl. n. 151; for an introduction to Stoicism, see The Stoics, reprint of the Chatto and Windus edition of 1975 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1994; copublished in the U.K. by Gerald Duckworth and Company Ltd.). Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533–92), French writer (to whom we owe the term ‘essay’ in the literary sense) and philosopher; his philosophical skepticism is stated most fully in his “Apology” (i.e., “Defense”): “Apologie de Raymond Sebond,” in the Essais (Bordeaux, France: S. Millanges, 1580); translation, An Apology for Raymond Sebond, translated and edited with introduction and notes by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1993). Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), Dutch physician who made his name in England as a satirist and philosopher; he is best known (cf. the work by Hutcheson, below) for his The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits: Containing Several Discourses to Demonstrate That Human Frailties, During the Degeneracy of Mankind, May Be Turn’d to the Advantage of the Civil Society, and Made to Supply the Place of Moral Virtues (London: J. Roberts, 1714); edited, with introduction, by E. J. Hundert (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1997). Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), British philosopher and proponent of the “moral sense” theory in ethics; he first introduced this theory in his An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises, in Which the Principles of the Earl of Shaftesbury Are Explain’d and Defended Against the Author of The Fable of The Bees, and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are Establish’d According to the Sentiments of the Antient Moralists. With an
The determining bases on the left side\textsuperscript{161} are, one and all, empirical and are obviously not suitable at all for [being] the universal principle of morality. But those on the right side are based on reason (for perfection as a characteristic of things, and the highest perfection conceived in substance, i.e., God, can both be thought only through rational concepts). However, the first concept [on the right side], viz., that of perfection, can be taken either in a theoretical [or in a practical] signification. [In the former] it signifies nothing but the completeness of each thing in its kind (transcendental perfection) or of a thing merely as thing as such\textsuperscript{162} (metaphysical perfection), and this cannot be the issue here. But the concept of perfection in the practical signification is the suitability or adequacy of a thing to all sorts of purposes.\textsuperscript{163} This perfection, as a characteristic of the human being and consequently as internal, is nothing other than talent and what strengthens or complements it, skill. The highest perfection in substance, i.e., God, and consequently as external, is (as considered for a practical aim)\textsuperscript{164} the adequacy of this being to all purposes\textsuperscript{165} as such. Suppose, then, that purposes must be given to us beforehand, in reference to which alone the concept of perfection (an internal perfection in ourselves\textsuperscript{166} or an external one in God\textsuperscript{167}) can become a determining basis of the will; and that a purpose—as

\textsuperscript{161} [I.e., the subjective determining bases.]

\textsuperscript{162} [\textit{überhaupt}. See above, Ak. V, 3 br. n. 3.]

\textsuperscript{163} [Or ‘ends’: \textit{Zwecke}. See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 121.]

\textsuperscript{164} [\textit{in praktischer Absicht betrachtet}. On Vorländer’s reading of the punctuation this parenthetical insertion occurs immediately after ‘and consequently external’ and hence is associated with that clause.]

\textsuperscript{165} [Or ‘ends’: \textit{Zwecke}. See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 121.]

\textsuperscript{166} [Cf. the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, Ak. VI, 391–93, 446–47.]

\textsuperscript{167} [Cf. ibid., Ak. VI, 487–89.]
an object that must precede the will’s determination by a practical rule and contain the basis of the possibility of such a determination—and hence the matter of the will, taken as the will’s determining basis, is always empirical and hence can serve as the Epicurean principle of the doctrine of happiness but never as the pure rational principle of the doctrine of morals and of duty. (For, indeed, talents and their furtherance can then become a motivating cause of the will only because they contribute to the advantages of life; or the will of God—if agreement with it has been taken as the will’s object without an antecedent practical principle independent of the idea of God’s will—can become such a motivating cause only through the happiness that we expect from it.) If we suppose this, it follows, first, that all the principles listed here are material; second, that they encompass all possible material principles; and, finally, the conclusion from this, that, since (as has been proved) material principles are entirely unsuitable for [being] the supreme moral law, the formal practical principle of pure reason—according to which the supreme and direct determining basis of the will must consist in the mere form of a universal legislation possible through our maxims—is the only possible principle that is suitable for categorical imperatives, i.e., practical laws (which make action duties), and in general for the principle of morality both in judging and in applying it to the human will in determining that will.

I

On the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason

This Analytic establishes that pure reason can be practical, i.e., that it can on its own, independently of everything empirical, determine the will; specifically, it establishes this through a fact\[168\] wherein pure reason does indeed prove itself in us practically, viz., the autonomy in the principle of morality by which pure reason determines the will to the deed. At the same time the Analytic shows that this fact is inseparably linked with the consciousness of the freedom of the will—indeed, that it and this consciousness are one and the same. Through this consciousness of its freedom the

\[168\] [On the fact of reason, see above, Ak. V, 31 incl. br. n. 75.]
will of a rational being that, as belonging to the world of sense, cognizes itself as necessarily subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes, is yet in the practical [sphere] at the same time conscious—on another side, viz., as a being in itself—of its existence [as] determinable in an intelligible order of things. It is conscious of this not, indeed, in conformity with a special intuition\textsuperscript{169} of itself, but in conformity with certain dynamical laws that can determine its causality in the world of sense. For, [my assertion] that freedom, if it is attributed to us, transfers us into an intelligible order of things has been proved sufficiently elsewhere.\textsuperscript{170}

Now if we compare with this Analytic the analytical part of the critique of pure speculative reason,\textsuperscript{171} we can see a noteworthy contrast between the two. Not principles but pure sensible \textit{intuition} (space and time) was there the first datum that made a priori cognition possible, although only for objects of the senses. Synthetic principles [derived] from mere concepts without intuition were impossible; rather, these principles could occur only in reference to intuition, which was sensible, and thus only in reference to objects of possible experience; for solely the concepts of understanding, combined\textsuperscript{172} with this intuition, make possible that cognition which we call experience. Beyond objects of experience, hence concerning things as noumena, speculative reason was quite rightly denied anything positive [by way] of \textit{cognition}. Speculative reason did, however, accomplish this much: it secured the concept of noumena—i.e., the possibility, indeed the necessity, of thinking such [things]—and, e.g., rescued from all objections the assumption of freedom, considered negatively, as entirely compatible with those principles and restrictions of pure theoretical reason, yet without allowing us to cognize anything determinate and expansive,\textsuperscript{173} since it rather cut off any such prospect entirely.

On the other hand, although the moral law does not provide us with a \textit{prospect}, it nonetheless provides us with a fact that is absolutely inexplicable from any data of the world of sense and from the entire range of our theoretical use of reason—a fact that points to a pure world of understanding,

\textsuperscript{169} [Viz., intellectual intuition (of a pure world of understanding, about to be mentioned in the next paragraph). See above, Ak. V, 31 br. n. 77.]

\textsuperscript{170} [\textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, Section III: Ak. IV, 446–63.]

\textsuperscript{171} [See the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A 19–292/B 33–349.]

\textsuperscript{172} [Or ‘linked’: \textit{verbunden}.]

\textsuperscript{173} [I.e., anything that would expand (\textit{erweitern}) cognition.]
and indeed even *positively determines* that world and allows us to cognize something of it, viz., a law.

This law is to furnish to the world of sense, as a *sensible nature*, the form (as far as rational beings are concerned)\(^{174}\) of a world of understanding, i.e., a *suprasensible nature*, yet without impairing the mechanism of sensible nature. Now, nature in the most general meaning is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws, and hence is, for reason, *heteronomy*. The suprasensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws that are independent of any empirical condition and that hence belong to the *autonomy* of pure reason. And since the laws according to which the existence\(^{175}\) of things depends on cognition are practical, suprasensible nature, insofar as we can frame a concept of it, is nothing other than a *nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason*. The law of this autonomy, however, is the moral law, which is therefore the basic law of a suprasensible nature and of a pure world of understanding whose counterpart\(^{176}\) ought to exist in the world of sense, yet without impairing that world’s laws. The former nature could be called the *archetypal*\(^{177}\) nature (*natura archetypa*), which we cognize merely in reason, whereas the latter—because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former nature as determining basis of the will—could be called the *ectypal*\(^{178}\) nature (*natura ectypa*). For in fact the moral law transfers us, in [our] idea, into a nature in which pure reason, if it were accompanied by the physical power adequate to it, would produce the highest good, and determines our will to confer the form [of a world of understanding] on the world of sense as a whole of rational beings.\(^{179}\)

That this idea actually serves as the model for our determinations of the will—as a pattern, as it were—is confirmed by the commonest attentiveness to oneself.

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\(^{174}\) [On Vorländer’s reading of the punctuation, this parenthetical insertion occurs immediately after ‘as a *sensible nature*’ and hence qualifies that clause.]

\(^{175}\) [*Dasein* here, *Existenz* in all the preceding occurrences in this paragraph.]

\(^{176}\) [Literally, ‘counterimage’: *Gegenbild*.]

\(^{177}\) [*urbildlich*, from *Urbild* (‘archetype’), literally ‘original image.’]

\(^{178}\) [*nachgebildete*, i.e., roughly, ‘reproduced’ or ‘copied.’]

\(^{179}\) [Cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 807–11 = B 835–39.]
When the maxim according to which I intend to give testimony is tested by practical reason, I always consider how the maxim would be if it held as a universal law of nature. Obviously, in this mode the [maxim as such a] law would compel everyone to be truthful. For to accept statements as proof and yet as deliberately untrue is not consistent with the universality of a law of nature. Similarly, the maxim that I adopt concerning the free disposition of my life is at once determined when I ask myself how this maxim would have to be in order for a nature to maintain itself according to a law based thereon. Obvious, in such a nature no one could end his life by choice, for such a constitution would not be an enduring order of nature. And thus in all other cases. However, in actual nature, as far as it is an object of experience, the free will by itself is not determined to such maxims as could on their own establish a nature according to universal laws, or as would by themselves even fit into a nature arranged according to such laws; rather, its maxims are private inclinations that do indeed amount to a whole of nature according to pathological (physical) laws, but not to a nature [of the sort] that would be possible only through our will according to pure practical laws. Nonetheless, through reason we are conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as if through our will an order of nature must at the same time arise. Therefore this law must be the idea of a nature not given empirically and yet possible through freedom, hence of a suprasensible nature to which, at least in a practical reference, we give objective reality, since we regard it as an object of the will of ourselves as pure rational beings.

Hence the difference between the laws of a nature to which the will is subject and those of a nature that is subject to a will (in regard to what refers the will to its free actions) rests on this: that in the former nature the objects must be causes of the presentations that determine the will, but in the latter nature the will is to be the cause of the objects, so that the will’s causality has its determining basis solely in the pure power of reason, a power that can therefore also be called a pure practical reason.

180 [nötigen. See above, Ak. V, 20 br. n. 17.]
181 [nach einem Gesetze derselben.]
182 [willkürliche.]
183 [I.e., of nature: Verfassung.]
184 [I.e., applicability to things as objects.]
185 [Emphasis expanded to include ‘is subject,’ to improve readability.]
There are, therefore, two very different problems: how, on the one hand, pure reason can a priori cognize objects; and how, on the other hand, it can be directly a determining basis of the will, i.e., of the rational being's causality regarding the actuality of objects (merely through the thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as law).

The first problem, as belonging to the critique of pure speculative reason, requires that we explain beforehand how intuitions, without which no object can be given to us and hence none can be cognized [by us] synthetically at all, are possible a priori; and its solution turns out to be that these intuitions are, one and all, only sensible and hence do not make possible any speculative cognition that would go further than possible experience extends, and that therefore all the principles of that pure speculative reason accomplish nothing more than making experience possible, either of given objects or of those that may be given ad infinitum but are never completely given.

The second problem, as belonging to the critique of practical reason, requires no explanation as to how the objects of the power of desire are possible, for this, as a problem of the theoretical cognition of nature, is left to the critique of speculative reason, but only as to how reason can determine the will's maxim, whether this occurs only by means of empirical presentations as determining bases, or whether even pure reason would be practical and be a law of a possible order of nature not cognizable empirically at all. The possibility of such a suprasensible nature, the concept of which can at the same time be the basis of that nature's actuality through our free will, requires no a priori intuition (of an intelligible world), which in this case, as suprasensible, would also have to be impossible for us. For what counts is only the determining basis of volition in the maxims thereof: whether this determining basis is empirical or a concept of pure reason (of its lawfulness as such), and how it can be the latter. Whether or not the causality of the will is sufficient for [bringing about] the actuality of the objects is left to reason's theoretical principles to judge; for this is an investigation of the possibility of the objects of volition, and hence in the practical problem the intuition of these objects does not at all amount to a moment of the problem. What counts here is only the determination of the will and the determining basis of the maxim of this will as a free will, not the result. For

186 [The aims of the critique of practical reason are limited; cf. the end of this paragraph.]

187 [Viz., as intellectual intuition. Cf. above, Ak. V, 42 br. n. 169, and 31 br n. 77.]

188 [I.e., key element: (das) Moment.]
provided that the will is lawful for pure reason, then its power in carrying out [its aims] may be what it may, and a nature may or may not actually arise according to these maxims of the legislation of a possible nature, the critique that investigates whether and how reason can be practical, i.e., can directly determine the will, does not worry about this at all.

In this task, therefore, the critique of practical reason can, without being censured, start from pure practical laws and their actuality, and must do so. But rather than on intuition, it bases these laws on the concept of their existence in the intelligible world, viz., the concept of freedom. For this concept signifies nothing else, and those laws are possible only in reference to freedom of the will; but on the presupposition of freedom they are necessary, or, conversely, freedom is necessary because those laws, as practical postulates, are necessary. How this consciousness of the moral law or, what is the same thing, the consciousness of freedom is possible cannot be further explained, but the admissibility of freedom can readily be defended in the theoretical critique.

The exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now done; i.e., we have shown, first, what the principle contains, that it subsists on its own entirely a priori and independently of empirical principles, and then what distinguishes it from all other practical principles. With the deduction, i.e., the justification of the principle’s objective and universal validity and of insight into the possibility of such a synthetic a priori proposition, one cannot hope to get on so well as was feasible with the principles of pure theoretical understanding. For the latter principles referred to objects of possible experience, viz., appearances, and we were able to prove that these appearances can be cognized as objects of experience only by being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws, and that consequently all possible experience must be commensurate with these laws. Such a course, however, I cannot take in the deduction of the moral law. For this law pertains not to the cognition of the constitution of objects that may be given to reason from elsewhere by something or other, but to a cognition insofar as it can itself become the basis of the existence of objects and insofar as reason, through this cognition, has causality in a rational being, i.e., [as a] pure reason that can be regarded as a power directly determining the will.

However, all human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at basic powers or basic abilities;\(^\text{189}\) for their possibility cannot be compre-
hended through anything, but neither must it be invented and assumed at one's discretion. Hence in the theoretical use of reason only experience can entitle us to assume them. But this substitute, adducing empirical proofs in place of a deduction from a priori sources of cognition, is also denied us here with regard to the pure practical power of reason. For, whatever requires that the basis for proving its actuality be brought from experience must be dependent, as regards the bases of its possibility, on principles of experience; but pure and yet practical reason, by its very concept, cannot possibly be considered to be of that sort. Moreover, the moral law is given as a fact, as it were, of pure reason of which we are conscious a priori and which is apodeictically certain, even supposing that in experience no example could be hunted up where it is complied with exactly. Therefore the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved through any deduction, through any endeavor of theoretical reason, speculative or empirically supported, and hence could not, even if one wanted to forgo apodeictic certainty, be confirmed through experience and thus proved a posteriori, and yet is—on its own—established.

However, something different and paradoxical [now] steps into the place of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, namely that, conversely, this principle itself serves as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable power that no experience was able to prove but that speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in order to find among its cosmological ideas what is unconditioned in terms of its causality, so as not to contradict itself): viz., the power of freedom, the freedom of which the moral law, which itself needs no justifying grounds, proves not only the possibility but the actuality in beings who cognize this law as obligating for them. The moral law is in fact a law of the causality through freedom and hence a law of the possibility of a suprasensible nature, just as the metaphysical law of the events in the world of sense was a law of the causality of

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190 [Or 'grasped': begriffen. Although in different contexts begreifen can also mean 'to comprise' and in that meaning is related to Begriff, i.e., 'concept,' it never means merely 'to conceive' (as this latter term is used in philosophy). Cf. my translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, A 792 = B 820 incl. br. n. 394.]

191 [Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, B 110, B 145–46, A 141/B 180–81; also the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 318.]

192 [Or 'optionally,' or perhaps 'arbitrarily': beliebig.]

193 [On the fact of reason, see above, Ak. V, 31 incl. br. n. 75.]

194 [auftreiben.]
sensible nature. Thus the moral law determines that which speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined, viz., the law for a causality the concept of which was only negative in speculative philosophy; and it thus first provides this concept with objective reality.

This kind of credential of the moral law, where it is itself put forth as a principle of the deduction of freedom as a causality of pure reason, is fully sufficient in place of any a priori justification, since theoretical reason was compelled to assume at least the possibility of [such] a freedom in order to fill a need that it has. For the moral law satisfactorily proves its [own] reality, even for the critique of speculative reason, by supplementing a causality thought merely negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason but which it nonetheless needed to assume, by positive determination [of this causality], viz., the concept of a reason directly determining the will (through the condition of a universal lawful form of the will's maxims). Thus the moral law is able for the first time to give to reason—which always became extravagant\footnote{I.e., transcendent: überschwenglich.} when it wanted to proceed speculatively with its ideas—objective although only practical reality, and converts reason's transcendent use into an immanent use (wherein reason, through ideas, is itself an efficient cause in the realm of experience).

The determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense, as such a world, can never be unconditioned, and yet for every series of conditions there must necessarily be something unconditioned, and hence there must also be a causality that determines itself entirely on its own. Therefore the idea of freedom as a power of absolute spontaneity was not a requirement, but—as far as its possibility is concerned—an analytic principle, of pure speculative reason. However, since it is absolutely impossible to give an example in conformity with this idea in any experience, because no determination of causality that would be absolutely unconditioned can be encountered among the causes of things as appearances, we were able to defend the thought of a freely acting cause, when we apply this thought to a being in the world of sense, [on the one hand,] only insofar as this being is also regarded as a noumenon, on the other hand. We defended this thought by showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all actions of the being as physically conditioned insofar as they are appearances, and yet at the same time regarding their causality as physically unconditioned insofar as the acting being is a being of the understanding, and in thus making the concept of freedom a regulative principle of reason. Although through this
[principle] I do not at all cognize the object to which such a causality is attributed, as to what this object is, I nonetheless remove the obstacle inasmuch as on the one hand, in the explanation of events in the world and hence also of the actions of rational beings, I do justice to the mechanism of natural necessity by going back from the conditioned to the condition ad infinitum, while on the other hand I keep open for speculative reason the place that is vacant for it, namely the intelligible, in order to transfer the unconditioned there. However, I was not able to realize this thought, i.e., to convert it into cognition of a being acting in this way, not even as regards merely its possibility. Pure practical reason now fills this vacant place with a determinate law of causality in an intelligible world (causality through freedom), viz., the moral law. Although speculative reason does not gain anything through this as regards its insight, it does gain something as regards securing its problematic concept of freedom, which is here provided with objective reality that, although only practical, is yet indubitable. Even the concept of causality, which properly has application and hence also signification (as the Critique of Pure Reason proves) only in reference to appearances in order to connect them into experiences—even this concept reason does not expand in such a way as to extend its use beyond the mentioned boundaries. For if it sought to do this, it would have to try to show how the logical relation of basis196 and consequence could be used synthetically with a kind of intuition different from the sensible,197 i.e., how a causa noumenon198 is possible. This it cannot accomplish at all; but as practical reason it is also in no way concerned with this, for it only posits the determining basis of the causality of the human being as a being of sense (a causality that is given) in pure reason (which is therefore called practical). Thus it needs the concept of the cause itself—from whose application to objects for the sake of theoretical cognition it can here abstract entirely (since this concept is always found a priori in the understanding, even independently of any intuition)—not in order to cognize objects but in order to determine the causality with regard to objects as such, and hence for none but a practical aim; and thus it can transfer the determining basis of the will into the intelligible order of things, inasmuch as it gladly199 admits at the

196 [Or 'ground': Grund; cf. above, Ak. V, 4 br. n. 36. Even here 'basis' is preferable, because the relation, although logical, is being taken beyond logic.]

197 [I.e., an intellectual intuition. See above, Ak. V, 31 br. n. 77.]

198 [Noumenal cause.]

199 [gerne.]
same time that it does not understand at all what sort of determination the concept of cause may have [that would allow] for cognition of these things. Of course, causality with regard to actions of the will in the world of sense must be cognized by reason in a determinate way, for otherwise practical reason could not actually give rise to any deed. But as for the concept that it frames of its own causality as noumenon, this concept it need not determine theoretically for the sake of cognizing this causality’s suprasensible existence, and thus it need not be able to give it signification to this extent. For this concept acquires signification anyway, even if only for practical use, viz., through the moral law. Even regarded theoretically it always remains a pure, a priori given concept of the understanding, which can be applied to objects whether these are given sensibly or not sensibly, although in the latter case the concept has no determinate theoretical signification and application but is merely the understanding’s formal but nonetheless essential thought of an object as such. The signification that reason provides to this concept through the moral law is solely practical, inasmuch as the idea of the law of a causality (causality of the will) itself has causality, or is its determining basis.

II

On the Authority\textsuperscript{200} of Pure Reason in Its Practical Use to an Expansion That Is Not Possible for It in Its Speculative Use

In the moral principle we have put forth a law of causality which posits the determining basis of this causality beyond all conditions of the world of sense; and, as regards the will—as to how, as belonging to an intelligible world, it is determinable—and hence as regards the subject of this will, the human being,\textsuperscript{201} we have not merely thought it (as could be done [even...\textsuperscript{200} [\textit{Befugnis}.]]

\textsuperscript{201} [I have removed the parentheses around ‘the human being’ (\textit{den Menschen}) in order to allow \textit{ihn} below—‘it,’ in ‘determined it’—to refer not only to the will but also to the human being, as I believe Kant (appropriately) intended, just as he did in the case of ‘thought it’ (even though there the grammar of the original sentence happens to obviate the use of \textit{ihn}).]
according to the critique of speculative reason) as belonging to a pure world of understanding though as unfamiliar\textsuperscript{202} to us in this reference, but have also determined it, with regard to its causality, by means of a law that cannot be classed with any natural law of the world of sense; and thus we have expanded our cognition beyond the boundaries of that world—a claim that, after all, the \emph{Critique of Pure Reason} declared void in all speculation. How, then, is the practical use of pure reason here to be reconciled\textsuperscript{203} with that same pure reason's theoretical use as regards determining the boundaries of pure reason's power?

\textit{David Hume}, who can be said to have in fact started all those challenges of the rights of a pure reason which made a complete investigation of these rights necessary,\textsuperscript{204} inferred as follows. The concept of \textit{cause} is a concept that contains the \textit{necessity} of the connection\textsuperscript{205} of the existence of what is different and, specifically, insofar as it is different—so that, if \(A\) is posited, I cognize that something entirely different from it, \(B\), must necessarily also exist.\textsuperscript{206} However, necessity can be attributed to a connection only insofar as the connection is cognized a priori; for experience would allow us to cognize concerning a linkage only that it is, but not that it is necessarily so. Now, it is impossible, he says, to cognize a priori and as necessary the connection between\textsuperscript{207} one thing and another (or between one determination\textsuperscript{208} and another entirely different from it), when [i.e.] they are not given in perception. Therefore the concept of a cause is itself fraudulent and deceptive. To talk about it in the mildest way: it is a delusion that can still be excused insofar as we have the \textit{habit}\textsuperscript{209} (a \textit{subjective} necessity) of perceiving certain things or their determinations [seen] repeatedly alongside or after one another as associated with one another in their existence, and this habit is inadvertently taken for an \textit{objective} necessity of positing such a connection in

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{unbekannt.} See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120.\

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{zu vereinigen.} Cf. above, Ak. V, 6 n. 64 incl. br. n. 64a.\

\textsuperscript{204} Cf. the \textit{Prolegomena}, Ak. III, 257–62, 310–13; also the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B 5, B 19–20, A 760 = B 788, A 764–67 = B 792–95.\

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Verknüpfung}; ‘linkage,’ below, renders \textit{Verbindung}. See above, Ak. V, 3 br. n. 14.\

\textsuperscript{206} Cf. the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A 90/B 122.\

\textsuperscript{207} [Reading, with Karl Rosenkranz, \textit{die Verbindung zwischen for die Verbindung, die zwischen}.]\

\textsuperscript{208} [Or ‘attribute’: \textit{Bestimmung}.]\

\textsuperscript{209} [Or ‘custom’: \textit{Gewohnheit}.]
the objects themselves. Thus the concept of cause is acquired surreptitiously and not legitimately; indeed, it can never be acquired or authenticated, because it demands a connection in itself void, chimerical, untenable before any reason, to which no object at all can ever correspond. Thus, with regard to all cognition that concerns the existence of things (hence mathematics still remained excepted), empiricism was first introduced as the sole source of principles, but with it at the same time the toughest skepticism with regard even to the whole of natural science (as philosophy). For on such principles we can never infer a consequence from given determinations of things in terms of their existence (because for this the concept of a cause, which contains the necessity of such a connection, would be required), but can only expect, according to the rule of our power of imagination, cases that are similar to what happens ordinarily; but this expectation is never secure, no matter how often it may have been fulfilled. Indeed, of no event could one say: something must have preceded it upon which it necessarily followed, i.e., it must have a cause; and hence, even if one were familiar with ever so frequent cases where such [an earlier event] preceded, so that a rule could be abstracted therefrom, one still could not, on that account, assume it as happening in this way always and necessarily. Thus one must also grant blind chance its right, and with blind chance all use of reason ceases; and this then firmly establishes, and makes irrefutable, skepticism regarding inferences ascending from effects to causes.

Mathematics had still come off well until then because Hume supposed that its propositions were all analytic, i.e., that they advanced from one determination to another on account of identity and hence according to the principle of contradiction. (However, this is false, for they are, rather, all synthetic; and although geometry, e.g., deals not with the existence of things but only with their a priori determination in a possible intuition, it nonetheless passes—just as well as [we do] through causal concepts—from one determination, A, to an entirely different one, B, as nonetheless connected with the former necessarily.) But in the end that science, so highly praised for its apodeictic certainty, must also succumb to empiricism in

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210 [Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 761–69 = B 789–797.]

211 [Einbildungskraft.]

212 [Satz. In most contexts, e.g., above, this term is translated as ‘proposition.’]

213 [Cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. III, 272–73.]

214 [Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, B 14–17.]
principles on the same basis on which Hume posited habit in the place of objective necessity in the concept of cause. Regardless of all its pride, it must put up with toning down its bold claims commanding a priori assent, and must expect approbation for the universal validity of its propositions from the indulgence of the observers who, as witnesses, would surely not refuse to admit that what the geometrician sets forth as principles they too had always perceived [to be] thus, and would consequently grant that, even though it is indeed not necessary, one may yet continue to expect it to be thus. In this way Hume’s empiricism in principles also leads unavoidably to skepticism even in regard to mathematics and consequently in every scientific theoretical use of reason (for this use belongs either to philosophy or to mathematics). 215 I will let each person judge on his own whether (in view of such a terrible overthrow as we see befalling the leaders 216 of cognition) the common use of reason will come through any better, and will not rather become entangled even more irretrievably in this same destruction of all science, and hence whether from the same principles a universal skepticism will not have to follow (although this skepticism would, to be sure, concern only scholars).

Now, as for my work in the Critique of Pure Reason—which was indeed prompted by that Humean skepticism 217 but yet went much further and encompassed the entire realm of pure theoretical reason in its synthetic use and hence also the realm of what is called metaphysics as such 218—I proceeded as follows as regards the doubt of the Scottish philosopher concerning the concept of causality. When Hume, taking objects of experience to be things in themselves (as, indeed, is done almost everywhere), declared the concept of cause to be deceptive and a false illusion, 219 he acted quite rightly. For concerning things in themselves and the determinations that they have as such, one cannot have insight into why because something, A, is posited, something else, B, must necessarily also be posited; and thus he could in no way grant such an a priori cognition of things in themselves. Still less could this acute man permit an empirical origin of this concept, since this [empirical] concept straightforwardly contradicts the connec-

215 [Cf. ibid., A 761–69 = B 789–797.]
216 [Literally, ‘heads’: Häupter.]
217 [Zweifellehre here, Skeptizismus elsewhere.]
218 [Cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. III, 257–62.]
219 [Blendwerk.]
tion's necessity which amounts to what is essential in the concept of causality. Hence the concept was proscribed, and into its place stepped habit in observing the course of perceptions.

From my investigations, however, it resulted that the objects with which we deal in experience are by no means things in themselves but merely appearances, and that, although with things in themselves one cannot at all tell and indeed cannot possibly have insight into how, if A is posited, it is to be contradictory for B, which is entirely different from A, not to be posited (the necessity of the connection between A as cause and B as effect), yet one can readily think that as appearances they must necessarily be linked in one experience in a certain way (e.g., with regard to time relations) and cannot be separated without contradicting that linkage by means of which this experience, wherein they are objects and wherein alone they are cognizable by us, is possible. And this is indeed what was found; and thus I was able not only to prove the concept of cause as to its objective reality with regard to objects of experience, but also to deduce it as an a priori concept because of the connection's necessity that the concept carries with it, i.e., to establish its possibility from pure understanding without empirical sources. And thus, after removing the empiricism concerning the concept's origin, I was able to uproot its inevitable consequence, namely skepticism, first regarding natural science and then also regarding mathematics because the skepticism there follows from quite completely the same bases—thus regarding both of the sciences that are referred to objects of possible experience—and thereby to uproot the total doubt of everything into which theoretical reason claims to have insight.

But what becomes of the application of this category of causality (and thus also of all the other categories, for without them no cognition of what exists can be brought about) to things that are not objects of possible experience but lie beyond the boundary of experience? For I was able to deduce the objective reality of these concepts only with regard to objects of possible experience. However, I have saved these concepts even in the mere case of my having shown that objects can at any rate be thought through them although not determined a priori; and it is precisely this that gives them a place in pure understanding, from which they are referred to objects as such.

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220 [Absehen.]

221 [Cf., in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Second Analogy of Experience, A 189–211/ B 232–56, where Kant presents his own critical view regarding the necessary connection between cause and effect.]
(sensible or not sensible). If anything is still lacking, it is the condition for the application of these categories, and specifically that of causality, to objects. This condition is intuition, which, where it is not given, makes impossible the application of the categories for the sake of theoretical cognition of the object as noumenon. Hence such cognition, if anyone ventures upon it, is utterly blocked (as indeed happened in the Critique of Pure Reason), whereas the objective reality of the concept [of causality] nonetheless always remains and can be used even for noumena, but without our being able to determine the concept theoretically in the least and thereby bring about a cognition. For that this concept, even in reference to an object, contains nothing impossible was proved by this: that its seat in pure understanding was secured in all application to objects of the senses; and even if perhaps thereafter, [as] referred to things in themselves (which cannot be objects of experience), it is not capable of being determined so that [one can] present a determinate object for the sake of a theoretical cognition, yet for the sake of something else (perhaps the practical) the concept could always still be capable of being determined for its application. This would not be so if, in accordance with Hume, this concept of causality contained something which it is not possible to think at all.

Now in order to discover this condition for the application of the mentioned concept to noumena we need only consider why we are not satisfied with its application to objects of experience but would like to use it also for things in themselves. For then we soon find that it is not a theoretical but a practical aim that makes this a necessity for us. Even if we were successful in this [application to noumena], for speculation we would still not be making any true acquisition in cognition of nature and, in general, with regard to objects that may perhaps be given to us. At most we would be taking a long step from the sensibly conditioned (as it is, we already have enough to do to stay with it and to wander diligently through the chain of causes) to the suprasensible, in order to complete and to bound our cognition from the side of the bases—even though an infinite gulf between that boundary and what we are acquainted with would always remain unfilled, and we would have listened more to an idle inquisitiveness than to a solid desire for knowledge.

222 [Cf. the Critique of Pure Reason, A 235–60/B 294–315.]

223 [Or ‘to perfect’: vollenden.]

224 [kennen. See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120.]
However, apart from the relation in which (in theoretical cognition) the understanding stands to objects, it also has one to the power of desire, which is therefore called the will and is called the pure will insofar as the pure understanding (which in that case is called reason) is practical through the mere presentation of a law. The objective reality of a pure will or—what is the same thing—of a pure practical reason is, in the moral law, given a priori through a fact,\(^{225}\) as it were; for so we may call a determination of the will which is unavoidable, even though it does not rest on empirical principles. The concept of a will, however, already contains the concept of causality, and hence the concept of a pure will already contains the concept of a causality with freedom—i.e., a causality that is not determinable according to laws of nature and consequently not capable of any empirical intuition as proof of its reality, but that nonetheless completely\(^{226}\) justifies its objective reality a priori in the pure practical law, though (as one can easily see\(^{227}\)) for the sake not of the theoretical but merely of the practical use of reason. Now, the concept of a being that has free will is the concept of a causa noumenon;\(^{228}\) and one is already assured that this concept does not contradict itself, because the concept of a cause, as having arisen entirely from pure understanding, as also—through the deduction—assured at the same time of its objective reality with regard to objects as such, while yet in its origin independent of all sensible conditions and therefore not by itself restricted to phenomena (unless one wanted to make a theoretical determinate use of it), can\(^{229}\) indeed be applied to things as pure beings of the understanding.\(^{230}\) But because one cannot base this application on any intuition, which always can only be sensible, causa noumenon is with regard to the theoretical use of reason indeed a possible, thinkable concept, but nonetheless an empty one. However, I also do not demand that through this concept I should be theoretically acquainted with\(^{231}\) the constitution of a being insofar as it has a pure will; it is enough for me that through this concept I

\(^{225}\) [On the fact of reason, see above, Ak. V, 31 incl. br. n. 75.]

\(^{226}\) [Or ‘perfectly’: vollkommen.]

\(^{227}\) [Literally, ‘have insight into’: einsehen.]

\(^{228}\) [Noumenal cause.]

\(^{229}\) [könne. Vorländer instead reads könnte, ‘could.’]

\(^{230}\) [reine Verstandeswesen. Beings of the understanding are noumena; see the Critique of Pure Reason, B 306.]

\(^{231}\) [kennen. See above, Ak. V, 35 br. n. 120.]
only designate it as such a being, and hence that I only link the concept of causality with that of freedom (and with what is inseparable from it, the moral law as determining basis of that [causality]). The authority for this does indeed belong to me by virtue of the pure rather than empirical origin of the concept of cause, inasmuch as I consider myself authorized to make no other use of it than in reference to the moral law that determines its reality, i.e., only a practical use.

If, with Hume, I had removed the objective reality from the concept of causality in its theoretical use not only with regard to things in themselves (the suprasensible) but also with regard to objects of the senses, then the concept would have lost all signification and, as a theoretically impossible concept, would have been declared entirely unusable; and since one also can make no use of nothing, the practical use of a theoretically null concept would have been entirely absurd. In fact, however, the concept of an empirically unconditioned causality, although theoretically empty (without an intuition that fits it), is nonetheless always possible and refers to an undetermined object; and in place of this [lacking signification] the concept is nonetheless given signification in the moral law and consequently in a practical reference. Therefore the concept, even though I do not have an intuition that would determine its objective theoretical reality for it, does nonetheless have actual application that can be exhibited in concreto in attitudes or maxims, i.e., it has practical reality that can be indicated; and this is indeed sufficient to justify it even with regard to noumena.

But this objective reality of a pure concept of understanding in the realm of the suprasensible, once introduced, now gives objective reality to all the other categories as well—though always only insofar as they are linked necessarily with the determining basis of the will (the moral law)—except that this objective reality is one that has merely practical applicability, while having not the slightest influence on theoretical cognition of these objects, as insight into their nature by pure reason, so as to expand this cognition. As indeed we shall find later, these categories always have reference

232 [Cf. the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. IV, 450–63.]

233 [Reading, with Otto Schöndörffer and with Paul Natorp in the Akademie edition, theorettischen for praktischen.]

234 [Nun.]

235 [Or 'indeterminate': unbestimmt.]

236 [Or 'through': an.]
only to beings as intelligences and, in them, also only to the relation of reason to the will and consequently always only to the practical, and beyond this lay no claim to any cognition of these beings. But whatever further properties belonging to the theoretical way of presenting such suprasensible things may be brought forward in connection with these categories, all of these are then classed not at all with knowledge, but only with the authority (however, for a practical aim, even with the necessity) to assume and presuppose them. This holds even where one assumes suprasensible beings (such as God) by an analogy, i.e., by the pure rational relation that we employ practically with regard to what is sensible. Thus by applying these categories to the suprasensible—but only for a practical aim—one does not give to pure theoretical reason the slightest encouragement to rove into the transcendent.

Analytic of Pure Practical Reason

Chapter II

On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason

By a concept of an object of practical reason I mean the presentation of an object as an effect possible through freedom. Therefore, to be an object of a practical cognition, as such, signifies only the reference of the will to the action through which the object or its opposite would be made actual;

237 [Verbindung.]
238 [Cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. III, 362–64.]
239 [Inserting, with Hartenstein, annimmt after bedienen and the subsequent comma.]
240 [Inserting eines Gegenstandes ('of an object'), as Natorp does in the Akademie edition and as is suggested also by Ernst von Aster, Otto Schöndörffer, and Karl Vorländer. I follow Vorländer in retaining einem Begriffe ('a concept') instead of reading dem Begriffe ('the concept'), as Paul Natorp does in the Akademie edition.]
241 [Objekt here, Gegenstand above and below. In this entire paragraph, and in the work as a whole, Kant uses the two terms interchangeably.]